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[A]nd there are those who seem so outraged by injury that they become greedy
for revenge, and thus they must ready harm for others.
- Dante, as Vergil'
INTRODUCTION
Many commentators endorse apologizing after injuring someone in the
course of medical treatment. The sentiment has been stated in its most elemental
form: "Say you're sorry when you hurt somebody."2 However, an apology has
special linguistic weight: it is an admission of regret, remorse and responsibility.
As such, apologies may prove a case of medical negligence. In an attempt to
decrease the potential harms of saying "I'm sorry" in the healthcare setting, some
state legislatures have enacted statutes intended to protect physicians. The thesis
of this Article is that apologies should not be issued in the medical setting, and
that apology laws are misguided. These laws work against the important social
policy goal of improving patient safety by discouraging healthcare workers from
openly acknowledging and correcting systematic errors and deficiencies in
human performance. Apology laws are also misguided because they bolster the
failed litigation regime of deterrence and corrective justice of medical injuries.
Lastly, these laws may require individual physicians to apologize for the actions
(or inactions) of a complex healthcare delivery system over which physicians
have little authority or control, rendering the apologies contrived and insincere.
Modem health care is a complex enterprise with a large and varied cast. A
non-exhaustive dramatis personae would include state and national accreditation
bodies, federal and third-party payers, hospital-wide committees, administrators,
credentialed general care and specialty physicians, advanced practitioners,
nurses, and support personnel. When there is a medical injury ascribed to error,
many-indeed most-of the above-mentioned groups often play roles.
Over the past decade, medical injuries have been a significant societal
problem jeopardizing patients who undergo medical treatment. The Institute of
Medicine, in a landmark book called To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health
System, called national attention to the fact that medical errors were among the
top ten leading causes of death, and that the cost of preventable medical injuries
1. DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE DIVINE COMEDY OF DANTE ALIGHIERI: PURGATORIO, 282 (Robert M.
Durling ed. & trans., Oxford University Press 2003) (1314):
ed j chi per ingiuria par ch'aonti
si che sifa de la vendetta ghiotto,
e tal convien che '7 male altrui impronti:
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was between $17 and $29 billion. 3 Although complex, healthcare systems are
amenable to the same systems analyses as other organizational systems.
Similarly, principles of human performance as elucidated by cognitive
psychology are also adaptable to healthcare professionals and other workers.
The types of adverse events that may contribute to excessive cost, preventable
injury, and death include diagnostic errors, treatment errors, and preventive
errors.5 Other types of errors, such as equipment failures and failures to
communicate, also occur. 6 It is therefore imperative to use modern principles of
systems analysis and human performance to understand why medical errors take
place and to develop a methodology for identifying and preventing errors from
happening in the future.7
Surgical procedures are common causes of medical injury.8 For most
procedures, the long list of potential harms includes bleeding, infection, operative
site or other organ injury, disability, and death. The likelihood of various
complications is increased by pre-existing conditions such as heart disease,
emphysema, or diabetes-all widely recognized as lifestyle illnesses.9 Policies
designed to prevent the wrong operation, medication errors, and hospital acquired
infections are required for all facilities that perform operations and other invasive
procedures.'0 The transfusion of blood and blood products can also cause
injuries, such as cardiovascular collapse and death," even though the discipline
of transfusion medicine is subject to rigorous safeguards in laboratory testing,
patient identification, and administration. Diagnostic and therapeutic radiologic
procedures are also fraught with the potential for injury-delayed diagnosis can
3. INST. OF MED., Executive Summary, in To ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH
SYSTEM 2 (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000).
4. MARILYN SUE BOGNER, Introduction to HUMAN ERROR IN MEDICINE 1, 4 (Marilyn Sue
Bogner ed., 1994).
5. Lucian L. Leape et al., Preventing Medical Injury, 19 QUALITY REV. BULL. 144, 145 (1993)
(listing types of errors seen in healthcare systems).
6. Id.
7. See JAMES REASON, HUMAN ERROR 17 (1990) (explaining that hindsight alone does not
equal foresight).
8. Knowing surgery best, and the consequences of medical injury in the perioperative setting,
the focus of the present analysis will be on injuries in surgical patients. Although the precise types
of injury may vary in other medical disciplines, the principles are the same.
9. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, U. S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, THE BURDEN OF CHRONIC DISEASES AND THEIR RISK FACTORS NATIONAL AND
STATE PERSPECTIVES 34-39 (2004), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/burdenbook2004/pdf/
burden book2004.pdf.
10. THE JOINT COMMISSION ACCREDITATION PROGRAM: HOSPITAL NATIONAL PATIENT SAFETY
GOALS, http://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/6/2011 NPSGsHAP.pdf (effective Jan. 1,
2011).
I1. Eleftherios C. Vamvakas & Morris A. Blajchman, Transfusion-Related Mortality: The
Ongoing Risks of Allogeneic Blood Transfusion and the Available Strategies for Their Prevention,
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arise from a missed finding or a delay in receipt of information by the responsible
treating physician. Contrast agents and inaccurate dosages of ionizing radiation
also pose risks. Lastly, every medication has side effects, ranging from mild to
lethal. In addition, medications pass through physicians, nurses, and pharmacists
on their way to patients. At each step along the way-from ordering to
transcription to dispensing to administration-the potential for injury is present.
Advising against apology does not mean blocking communication of adverse
events to patients. Modem emphasis on patient autonomy means that the patient
must be informed of adverse events for the purpose of making informed
decisions regarding future care.12 Better approaches to patient disclosure include
institutional use of careful accounts-a type of remedial work-by the
responsible healthcare organization and legislative assistance in strengthening
privileged communications regarding documents generated in the pursuit of
improved patient safety, which would otherwise be admissible as business
records under applicable rules of evidence. Concerns of creating moral hazard in
physicians emboldened by the absence of a need to apologize when error occurs
are abated by increased oversight from government and non-governmental
organizations, greater emphasis on credentialing and maintenance of
competencies, accountability in medical staff affairs, and identification and
management of the impaired physician. Lastly, there is an evolving
understanding of professional commitment to the principles of patient safety and
improved quality of care.1 3
1. THE COMPLEXITIES OF MODERN MEDICINE
A. Risks of Injury in Contemporary Medical Care
During one year-old Jeanella Aranda's surgery for a liver tumor, damage to
blood vessels left her in a non-survivable condition without a new liver. Her
parents were told that one of them might be able to donate part of their own liver
to save their daughter's life. A laboratory error led Baylor University surgeons to
surgically remove and transplant half of the father's liver into Jeanella when in
fact the mother should have been the donor.14 The father survived his
unnecessary operation, but the infant died 20 days later. At another hospital in
Rhode Island, surgeons operated on the wrong side of the brain in three separate
12. JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 104-29 (2002).
13. Troyen A. Brennan, Physicians' Responsibility To Improve the Quality of Care, 77 ACAD.
MED. 973, 976 (2002); see also Anthony D. Whittemore, The Competent Surgeon: Individual
Accountability in the Era of "Systems" Failure, 250 ANN. SURGERY 357 (2009).
14. Denise Grady & Lawrence K. Altman, Suit Says Transplant Error Was Cause in Baby's
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patients within the course of a year.1
The aphorism "first, do no harm" is well known to all physicians and
surgeons.' 6 Yet every surgeon accepts the uncomfortable fact that he or she will
make errors leading to complications and death.'7 There is no such thing as a
"mask of infallibility;"' 8 widespread media coverage has unmasked the medical
profession-revealing a fallibility that sometimes brings catastrophic results.' 9
Each step in the medical process imposes the possibility of error and injury.
To Err is Human, published barely a decade ago, documented the rates of
medical injury and error and suggested ways to improve patient safety. 20 It
garnered widespread attention from the public, the media, and legislators for its
finding that as many as 98,000 people die annually from medical errors in
hospitals. 2 1 Errors in the delivery of medical care caused more deaths than motor
vehicle accidents, breast cancer, or AIDS.22
Three seminal studies provided the support for the conclusions of To Err is
Human. The first was the largely unheralded Medical Insurance Feasibility Study
done in the early 1970s by the California Medical Association and California
Hospital Association.2 3 The second, the Harvard Medical Practice Study
15. Felice J. Freyer, Hospital Fined in Wrong-Site Surgery, PROVIDENCE J., Nov. 27, 2007,
http://www.projo.com/news/content/WRONG Site 11-27-07 PB818Q7 vl2.2704b40.html.
16. Cedric M. Smith, Origin and Uses of Primum Non Nocere-Above All, Do No Harm!, J.
CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 371, 372 (2005) (reviewing the likely origin of the phrase and
concluding prominent English physician Thomas Sydenham, not Hippocrates, was the author).
17. Charles L. Bosk, FORGIVE AND REMEMBER: MANAGING MEDICAL FAILURE 50 (1979)
(citing an anonymous surgeon: "It would look suspicious if you are doing major surgery and, week
after week, you have no deaths and complications. You're going to have these, especially deaths, if
you do major surgery.").
18. Marlynn Wei, Doctors, Apologies, and the Law: An Analysis and Critique of Apology
Laws, 40 J. HEALTH L. 107, 147 (2007).
19. RICHARD I. COOK ET AL., A TALE OF Two STORIES: CONTRASTING VIEWS OF PATIENT
SAFETY (1998), available at www.npsf.org/rc/tts/npsf w97.doc (documenting a comprehensive
bibliography of "celebrated" cases of medical errors leading to injury or death that have attracted a
great deal of attention from the public, regulators, the media, and the courts). Willie King (Florida)
had the wrong leg amputated. Betsy Lehman (Massachusetts) and Vincent Gargano (Illinois) died
of cancer chemotherapy overdoses. Ben Kolb (Florida) died receiving a syringe full of epinephrine
rather than a local anesthetic. Libby Zion (New York) died of a drug-drug interaction allegedly due
to decisions made by overworked resident doctors. Id.
20. INST. OF MED., supra note 3, at 26.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Don Harper Mills, Medical Insurance Feasibility Study: A Technical Summary, 128 W.J.
MED. 360, 362-64 (1978). The intent of the study was to provide data on the type, frequency, and
severity of compensable disabilities in an attempt to estimate the cost of alternatives to the existing
medical malpractice regime. Review of records from 20,864 hospital admissions to twenty three
California hospitals found that potentially compensable events (similar to current definitions of
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(HMPS), reviewed 30,195 New York hospital records from the year 1984 and
documented a medical injury rate of 3.7%.24 The HMPS was criticized as being
from one state and one year. In response, thirteen Utah and fifteen Colorado
hospitals were chosen to participate in a similar study for the year 1992.25 This
third study, a survey of 1047 patients admitted to two intensive care units and
one surgical unit at a large teaching hospital, documented a correlation between
the incidence of medical injury and increasing complexity of care.26 In a study of
44,603 patients who underwent surgery between 1977 and 1990 at a large
medical center, 2428 patients (5.4 percent) suffered adverse events.27 A study of
surgical care from the Colorado and Utah data cited above found that injuries
resulting in death, disability, or a prolonged hospital stay were no more likely to
permanent, and 9.7% resulted in death. Patients aged 65 or older were statistically more likely to
sustain an injury, and nearly 72% of the events occurred in the operating room. Id.
24. Troyen A. Brennan et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in Hospitalized
Patients: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study 1, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED. 370, 371-72
(1991). Although most of these adverse events gave rise to complete recovery in less than six
months, 2.6% involved permanently disabling injuries and 13.6% resulted in death. Further study
of these records identified 1133 patients with disabling injuries; drug complications were most
common (19%), followed by wound infections (14%), and technical complications (13%). Nearly
half were associated with an operation (48%), and the rate of injuries in those aged 64 and over was
twice that of patients under age 45. Id
25. Eric J. Thomas et al., Incidence and Types of Adverse Events and Negligent Care in Utah
and Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 261, 264-67 (2000) (submitting for review non-psychiatric hospital
discharge records; 5,000 in Utah and 10,000 in Colorado). Five hundred eighty seven medical
injuries were identified; for a rate of 2.9 % of hospitalizations in each state. The rate of injury
associated with operations was again nearly half (44.9%.) More than four in five of the recorded
injuries occurred in the hospital, with the rest occurring prior to admission in non-hospital settings.
A lower percentage of deaths due to injuries (6.6%) were found when compared to the HMPS
(13.6%). Id.
26. Lori B. Andrews et al., An Alternative Strategy for Studying Adverse Events in Medical
Care, 349 LANCET 309, 311-12 (1997). Ethnographers trained in qualitative observational research
integrated into physician teams for attending rounds, residents' work rounds, nursing shift changes,
case conferences, and other scheduled meetings, and various departmental and section meetings.
Data were collected about health-care providers' own assessments about the appropriateness of the
care that patients received to assess the nature and impact of adverse events and how health-care
providers and patients responded to the injury. Of the 1047 patients in the study, 185 (17.7%) were
reported to have had at least one serious injury defined along a spectrum from temporary physical
disability to death. The likelihood of having a medical injury was linked to the seriousness of the
patient's underlying illness. Patients with long stays in hospital had more injuries than those with
short stays. The likelihood of experiencing an injury increased 6% for each day of hospital stay.
The most common causes of injury were individuals (37.8%), interactive causes (15.6%), or
administrative decisions (9.8%). Injuries discussed in the various settings were recorded and a
classification scheme was developed to code the data. A major difference was the real-time nature
of the data collection in contrast to the three seminal studies. Id.
27. Hunter H. McGuire et al., Measuring and Managing Quality of Surgery: Statistical vs
Incidental Approaches, 127 ARCHIVES SURGERY 733, 734-36 (1992). Somewhat less than one-half
of these adverse events were considered attributable to error. During the same hospitalization, 749
patients died during; 7.5 percent of these deaths were attributed to error. Id.
273
7
Raper: No Role for Apology
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
occur with surgical care than with nonsurgical care.28
To Err is Human focused widespread attention on the simple fact that
patients were not always safe in the healthcare setting. There existed a
widespread problem of medical injury with and without error. To the public,
documentation that doctors, nurses, and others in the healthcare setting could
make errors and injure patients was a revelation. However, To Err is Human
made the novel suggestion that improving patient safety required healthcare
leadership to identify and correct faulty systems in which errors could happen,
rather than a focus on punitive approaches, like malpractice litigation, when
patients were injured by medical diagnosis and treatment. The main message of
To Err is Human was later elegantly summarized:
"Most errors are committed by good, hardworking people trying to do the right
thing . . . . It is far more productive to identify error-prone situations and
settings and to implement systems that prevent caregivers from committing
errors . . . .,29
And yet, medical injuries appear unavoidable in the healthcare delivery
system and occur throughout the spectrum of medical care. 30 The recognition that
patients are injured through error has led to an emphasis on patient safety
initiatives. After the publication of To Err is Human, the IOM released a second
medical error analysis in 2001, Crossing the Quality Chasm, which made further
recommendations for enhancing patient safety in healthcare institutions.
28. Atul A. Gawande et al., The Incidence and Nature of Surgical Adverse Events in Colorado
and Utah in 1992, 126 SURGERY 66, 69-71 (1999). Among surgical injuries, 54% were considered
to be preventable. Fifteen common operations each accounted for 1% or more of surgical injuries.
Id.
29. Robert M. Wachter & Peter J. Pronovost, Balancing "No Blame" with Accountability in
Patient Safety, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1401, 1401 (2009).
30. To conform to the terminology extant in the patient safety literature, most definitions are
derived from the Institute of Medicine (IOM) study "To Err is Human." An adverse event is an
injury resulting from a medical intervention, or in other words, it is not due to the underlying
condition of the patient.
31. COMMITTEE ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE CROSSING
THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2001) (proposing
improvements in six dimensions towards which all healthcare constituencies should strive). These
six dimensions are: Safe-avoiding injuries to patients from the care that is intended to help them.
Effective-providing services based on scientific knowledge to all who could benefit and refraining
from providing services to those not likely to benefit (avoiding underuse and overuse, respectively).
Patient-centered-providing care that is respectful of and responsive to individual patient
preferences, needs, and values and ensuring that patient values guide all clinical decisions.
Timely-reducing waits and sometimes harmful delays for both those who receive and those who
give care. Efficient-avoiding waste, including waste of equipment, supplies, ideas, and energy.
Equitable-providing care that does not vary in quality because of personal characteristics such as
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B. Patient Safety: The Need for Protected Disclosure
1. Health System-based Approaches to Making Patients Safer
Since 2004, there has been a steady decline in the number of reported
wrong-site surgeries in Pennsylvania.3 2 Many factors could be contributing to this
decrease: implementation of a universal protocol or "pause for safety," intra-
institutional confidential reporting of injuries, mandatory reporting to a state
patient safety authority, and root cause analysis to prevent similar events in the
future. The patient safety movement is based on concepts learned from diverse
disciplines and their disasters, many of which are imprinted on the collective
conscience: the nuclear reactor industry (Three Mile Island, Chernobyl) , the
chemical industry (Bhopal),34 the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(Challenger, Columbia),3 5 and the airlines industry.36 The overarching goals of
the patient safety approach are to prevent injuries caused during medical
diagnosis and treatment and to reduce errors through systemic change. Patient
safety advocates push for transparency through confidential reporting
requirements, which are required and may even be anonymous. No single data
source is sufficient to gain a complete understanding of errors contributing to
actual or potential medical injury, so thought has been given to the development
of a culture of patient safety: 37 a culture reconciling professional accountability
with the need to create a safe environment to report medical errors.
Accurate reporting of outcomes is crucial to improving patient safety.
Surgeons were first challenged to report procedural outcomes a century ago by
Ernest A. Codman.39 He chastised public-or "charity"-hospitals for not
looking at patient outcomes. Codman charged individual physicians with not
wanting to standardize or report how their patients fared because hospitals would
32. Pennsylvania Patient Safety Authority Wrong-Site Surgery Reports by Quarter, PATIENT
SAFETY AUTH. (Dec. 2010), http://patientsafetyauthority.org/EducationalTools/PatientSafetyTools/
PWSS/Documents/psrsqreports.pdf.
33. REASON, supra note 7, at 189.
34. Id at 191.
35. Id at 192; see also Space Shuttle Columbia and Her Crew, NASA, http://www.nasa.gov/
columbia/home/index.htmI (last visited May 5, 2011).
36. Accidents Involving Passenger Fatalities U. S. Airlines (Part 121) 1982-Present, NAT'L
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, http://www.ntsb.gov/ aviation/Paxfatal.htm (last visited Mar. 7,
2010).
37. Develop a Culture of Safety, IHI.ORG, http://www.ihi.org/knowledge/Pages/Changes/
DevelopaCultureofSafety.aspx (last visited July 20, 2011).
38. AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, AHRQ's PATIENT SAFETY INITIATIVE:
BUILDING FOUNDATIONS, REDUCING RISK (2003), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/pscongrpt.
39. ERNEST A. CODMAN, A STUDY IN HOSPITAL EFFICIENCY: As DEMONSTRATED BY THE CASE
REPORT OF THE FIRST FIVE YEARS OF A PRIVATE HOSPITAL 49 (1996).
275
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not want the expense.4 0 Codman classified sub-optimal outcomes as due to one or
more of several causes: lack of technical knowledge or skill; lack of surgical
judgment; lack of care or equipment; lack of diagnostic skill; the patient's
"unconquerable disease;" the patient's refusal of treatment; those accidents and
complications over which there was no known control; and lastly,
acknowledgment of the fact that not all sub-optimal outcomes could be attributed
to error-"the calamities of surgery."41 Codman was blunt in his criticism of his
surgical colleagues: "[Y]ou let the members of the medical staff throw away
money [by causing] unnecessary deaths, ill-judged operations and careless
diagnoses. . . .42 At the turn of the twentieth century, the tools necessary for
systems analysis did not exist, and the basic principles of human performance
and error were not well understood.
At the turn of the twenty-first century, a systems approach to improving
patient safety-as advocated by the IOM in To Err is Human-emerged based on
three principles: First, error is an inherent, unavoidable aspect of human work.
Second, faulty systems allow human error to lead to adverse events. Third,
systems can be designed that prevent or detect human error before such adverse
events occur.4 3 The systems approach to patient safety is supported by many
groups, including professional societies, medical centers, health insurance
purchasers, federal and state legislatures, and perhaps most importantly,
patients. 4 4 Low rates of adverse events now rank among the public's leading
measures of healthcare quality. 4 5 The results of a survey of over 2000 adults
indicate that people are more concerned about mistakes in hospitals than on
airplanes.46 A majority (71%) of survey respondents say that information about
medical errors would be one of the biggest helps in determining the quality of
providers.47 In sum, there is demand for transparency in medical injury.
However, it is crucial for all relevant parties to understand that most medical
injuries are attributable to system flaws rather than individual incompetence or
neglect.
Any worthwhile effort to improve such systems is likely to require
substantial collaboration among parties-with reporting used to guide
40. Id. at 53.
41. Id. at 59.
42. Id. at 17.
43. REASON, supra note 7, at 17.
44. Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Current Concepts: Disclosing Harmful Medical Errors to
Patients, 356 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2713, 2713 (2007).
45. Americans as Health Care Consumers: An Update on the Role of Quality Information,
KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION AND AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY (AHRQ),
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collaborative quality improvement efforts and not to punish the participants and
strictly protect the identity of individual physicians and hospitals.4 8 It is also
essential to recognize that to maintain or repair public faith in the United States
healthcare system, patient safety must be placed among the highest priorities of
social policy setting,49 and transparency must be ensured.o
Hence, it seems clear that a systems-based approach is a valuable tool
in the battle for medical injury reduction. Safe systems are designed by
taking into consideration appropriate credentialing of physicians and
surgeons and analyzing how hospital personnel interact with each other in
teams and how they use machines and equipment. Output of such analyses
includes the training and integration of new staff into existing teams, a
reconciliation of medications and allergies, a protocol to prevent operating
on the wrong patient or body part, procedures for checking equipment and
supplies prior to beginning surgery, and the provision of a blame-free
environment for organizational analysis and change to prevent future
adverse events.5 1
Physicians have taken the opportunity to improve the safety and quality of
care, anticipating the expansion of Internet resources in increasing public
awareness of patient safety and quality of care.52 Growing concerns about patient
safety have led to an increase in the percentage of patients who would choose a
highly rated surgeon whom they had not seen before over a less highly rated
surgeon whom had previously provided care; also a factor of publicly available
information. 5 3 Thus, improving patient safety is a matter of self-interest for the
provider as well as a mechanism for improving patient safety.54
Patient safety initiatives actually do make patients safer. Arguably the most
advanced program for outcomes assessment and safety improvement of surgical
outcomes is the National Surgical Quality Improvement Program (NSQIP),
48. Nancy J. 0. Birkmeyer et al., Partnering with Payers to Improve Surgical Quality: The
Michigan Plan, 138 SURGERY 815, 816 (2005).
49. Thomas R. Russell, Safety and Quality in Surgical Practice, 244 ANNALS SURGERY 653,
653 (2006).
50. Hiram C. Polk, Jr., Presidential Address: Quality, Safety, and Transparency, 242 ANNALS
SURGERY 293, 293 (2005).
51. INST. OF MED., supra note 3, at 62.
52. Andrew R. Robinson et al., Physician and Public Opinions on Quality of Health Care and
the Problem of Medical Errors, 162 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 2186, 2189 (2002)
(demonstrating that a majority of Colorado physicians and the public believe that reduction of
medical errors should be a national priority).
53. Americans as Health Care Consumers: Update on the Role of Quality Information,
Highlights of a National Survey, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. AND THE AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE
RESEARCH AND QUALITY (Mar. 13, 2010), www.ahrq.gov/qual/kfthighOO.htm.
54. Alain C. Enthoven & Laura A. Tollen, Competition in Health Care: It Takes Systems To
Pursue Quality and Efficiency, 24 HEALTH AFF. W5-420, W5-427 (2005).
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achieving a 27% decrease in thirty-day mortality after major procedures and a
45% decrease in morbidity in Veterans Affairs Medical Centers throughout the
country. 5 One important aspect of the NSQIP is that data are coded so only the
participating healthcare organizations know which data set belongs to them.56
The NSQIP was responsible for identifying intraoperative processes of care and
postoperative adverse events as important risk factors for prolonged hospital stay
after major elective surgery.57 Other notable findings were that for many
common procedures, there was no significant association between case volume at
a given hospital and thirty-day mortality.58 NSQIP has now expanded into the
broader community under the auspices of the American College of Surgeons
(ACS)." It has also been used to validate the Agency for Healthcare Research
and Quality (AHRQ) Patient Safety Indicators.60
Examples of successful safety improvement efforts within surgery in the
private sector are also numerous, and they include formalized team training at
Beth Israel Deaconess, resulting in a 53% decrease in potential adverse outcomes
in high-risk patients. 6 1 Using systems principles, and relying heavily on feedback
for medical injuries, the Northern New England Cardiovascular Disease Study
Group was able to decrease mortality rates 24%.62 Intermountain Health Systems
in Utah has developed interdisciplinary care standards,6 3 and the Maine Medical
Assessment Foundation has decreased rates of spine surgery and improved
55. Shukri F. Khuri et al., The Department of Veterans Affairs' NSQIP The First National,
Validated, Outcome-Based, Risk-Adjusted, and Peer-Controlled Program for the Measurement and
Enhancement of the Quality of Surgical Care, 228 ANNALS SURGERY 491, 507 (1998).
56. Shukri F. Khuri et al., The Comparative Assessment and Improvement of Quality of
Surgical Care in the Department of Veterans Affairs, 137 ARCHIVES SURGERY 20, 22 (2002).
57. Tracie Collins et al., Risk Factors for Prolonged Length of Stay After Major Elective
Surgery, 230 ANNALS SURGERY 251, 257-58 (1999).
58. Katherine S. Rowell et al., Use of National Surgical Quality Improvement Program Data
as a Catalyst for Quality Improvement, 204 J. AM. C. SURGEONS 1293, 1293 (2007).
59. Bruce L. Hall et al., Does Surgical Quality Improve in the American College of Surgeons
National Surgical Quality Improvement Program: An Evaluation of All Participating Hospitals,
250 ANNALS SURGERY 363, 368 (2009).
60. Patrick S. Romano et al., Validity of Selected AHRQ Patient Safety Indicators Based on
VA National Surgical Quality Improvement Program Data, 44 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 182, 183
(2009) (comparing AHRQ Patient Safety Indicators (PSI) against NSQIP data and to show that
further validation should be considered before most of the PSIs evaluated are used to publicly
compare or reward hospital performance).
61. Donald W. Moorman, On the Quest for Six Sigma, 189 AM. J. SURGERY 253, 256 (2005).
62. Gerald T. O'Connor et al., A Regional Intervention to Improve the Hospital Mortality
Associated with Cardiopulmonary Bypass Surgery, 275 JAMA 841, 842 (1996).
63. Judy Hougaard, Developing Evidence-Based Interdisciplinary Care Standards and
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outcomes.64 These organizations demonstrate four important characteristics: first,
frank reporting of adverse events in a protected manner; second, a systems
approach to quality improvement rather than placing blame; third, voluntary,
physician-led interventions as or more effective as external regulatory
mechanisms; and fourth, participation by providers in outcomes research as a
response to practice variations. 5  Recently, an explicit link between
improvements in patient safety have been shown to result in decreased
malpractice claims; an intuitive result but not one for which compelling data
exist. 66 Considerable obstacles to improving patient safety still exist.67 One
institutional hindrance to making patients safer is the entrenched notion that the
quality improvement methods already available are adequate to address adverse
events. 68 The persistence of patient safety problems in the face of such methods
should be a sufficient argument for the inadequacy of existing approaches.
Departmental morbidity and mortality (M&M) conferences are a traditional
venue for discussion of adverse events, but they frequently do not consider all
complications, are not consistently well-attended, and often do not involve
healthcare providers other than attending surgeons and residents.69 One study that
compared NSQIP data with traditional M&M conferences noted that the latter
failed to consider about 75% of the complications and about 50% of the deaths.
Further, education is usually stated as an important goal of the M&M conference,
which may work against full analysis of an adverse event.7' Arguably, M&M
64. Steven J. Atlas et al., Long-Term Outcomes of Surgical and Nonsurgical Management of
Lumbar Spinal Stenosis: 8 to 10 Year Results from the Maine Lumbar Spine Study, 30 SPINE 936,
943 (2005).
65. O'Connor, supra note 62, at 844; Eugene H. Shively et al., Practicing Surgeons Lead in
Quality Care, Safety, and Cost Control, 239 ANNALS SURGERY 752, 752-53, 762 (2004).
66. Michael D. Greenberg et al., Is Better Patient Safety Associated with Less Malpractice
Activity?: Evidence from California, RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE (2010),
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technicalreports/20 10/RAND TR824.pdf.
67. Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and
Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEx. L. REv. 1595, 1597 (2002); see also Robert S. Galvin,
The Business Case for Quality, 20 HEALTH AFF. 57 (2001) (identifying specific obstacles to include
a perceived vulnerability to legal discovery and liability, including: a traditional medical culture
based on individual responsibility (blame and shame); unreimbursed costs for patient safety
initiatives and quality; evolving medical informatics; the time and expense involved in defining and
implementing evidence-based practice; the local nature of health care, and the perception of the
lack of a business case, or, poor return on investment).
68. Mello & Brennan, supra note 67, at 1598.
69. Jay D. Orlander & B. Graeme Fincke, Morbidity and Mortality Conference: A Survey of
Academic Internal Medicine Departments, 18 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 656, 656 (2003).
70. Matthew M. Hutter et al., Identification of Surgical Complications and Deaths: An
Assessment of the Traditional Surgical Morbidity and Mortality Conference Compared With the
American College of Surgeons-National Surgical Quality Improvement Program, 203 J. AM.
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conferences present an obstacle to safety improvements by creating an illusion of
improvements in patient safety. One can imagine, among others, the following
specific obstacles to patient safety: resistance to admitting that errors have
occurred; traditional "shame and blame" medical culture based on individuals
rather than systems; fears that all discussions regarding injury or error are
discoverable and subject to liability; the time and expense of evidence-based
practice; inadequate resources due to the perception that a focus on safety is a
poor return on investment; and the local, disaggregated nature of healthcare
delivery and reporting.
2. Improving Human Performance
In addition to a fuller realization of the importance of systems in the
development of medical adverse events, principles of human performance are
also now understood to play a role. To be successful, a human task-based
performance (e.g., an operation) has three main phases: planning, storage, and
execution. Errors resulting from failures in performance may be classified as
slips, lapses, or mistakes,7 2 depending on which phase of the performance is
involved. In one sense, surgeon performance can be a system factor, but in
another sense, individual cognitive and technical ability make up a large part of a
system's safety barriers. Overemphasizing an individual physician's role retards
rather than advances understanding of systems failure, evoking defensiveness
rather than constructive action. A number of steps have been taken to address
problems of human performance.
Continuing medical education (CME) programs attempt to bridge knowledge
and quality of patient care, and are generally held confidential. Many states, as a
prerequisite for re-licensure, require a certain number of hours of CME
programs, yet the structural incentives associated with health care in the United
States lead to highly variable patterns of care and a widespread failure to
implement evidence-based practice. 73 There is a link between CME participation
72. REASON, supra note 7, at 9. Slips are failures of the execution phase, the storage phase, or
both, and lapses are failures of the storage phase both may occur regardless of whether the planned
procedure was adequate. Generally, slips are obvious or overt, whereas lapses are often hard to
detect, or covert. Mistakes are failures of planning, reflecting basic deficiencies or failures in
selecting an objective or specifying the means to achieve it, regardless of how well the plan was
executed. Id.
73. Molly J. Coye, No Toyotas in Health Care: Why Medical Care Has Not Evolved to Meet
Patient's Needs, 20 HEALTH AFF. 44, 46 (2001) (discussing lack of a business case for quality in
health care, and why each of the strategies intended to improve quality has been less effective than
anticipated). A business case for quality would require that purchasers, users, and providers
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and performance on board recertification examinations,74 and specialty board
certification is linked to improved outcomes. 7 5 A direct link between CME
participation and safer patient care is not as easy to confirm. Systematic reviews
of the differences in the impact various CME strategies have on actual practice
change have raised serious concerns about the value of some current CME
programs. 6 The strategies shown to be most effective for practice change (e.g.,
reminders, patient-mediated interventions, outreach visits, opinion leader input,
and multifaceted activities) place substantial emphasis on performance change
rather than simply on learning.77 There is evidence to suggest that despite some
methodological shortcomings, performance on cognitive examinations such as
certification and re-certification examinations is related to performance in
practice7 8 and that a physician's current certification status should be among the
evidence-based measures used in the quality movement.79
Legislative approaches to improvements in safety have also been tried.
Congress established the Medicare Utilization and Quality Control Peer Review
Program to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, economy, and quality of
services delivered to Medicare beneficiaries.o Peer review organizations (PROs),
were originally intended as a mechanism for professional self-evaluation but
subsequently became subject to anticompetitive abuse and other undesired
consequences. 1 The potential for inequity was a particular concern, in that
physicians who relinquished privileges on their own initiative might be treated
more leniently than those against whom action was initiated by a peer review
74. Robert S. Rhodes et al., Continuing Medical Education Activity and American Board of
Surgery Examination Performance, 196 J. AM. C. SURGEONS 604, 607 (2003).
75. Lisa K. Sharpet et al., Specialty Board Certification and Clinical Outcomes: The Missing
Link, 77 ACAD. MED. 534, 537 (2002).
76. Jack L. Dolcourt, Commitment to Change: A Strategy for Promoting Educational
Effectiveness, 20 J. CONTINUING EDUC. HEALTH PROF. 156, 157 (2000).
77. Paul E. Mazmanian, Institute Of Medicine Recommends a Continuing Professional
Development Institute For U.S. Health Professions, 30 J. CONTINUING EDUC. HEALTH PROF. 1, 2
(2010); see also Paul E. Mazmanian & David A. Davis. Continuing Medical Education and the
Physician as Learner: Guide to the Evidence, 288 JAMA 1057, 1059 (2002).
78. Robyn Tamblyn et al., Association Between Licensure Examination Scores And Practice
In Primary Care, 288 JAMA 3019, 3024 (2002); see also John J. Norcini & Rebecca S. Lipner, The
Relationship Between the Nature of Practice and Performance On A Cognitive Examination, 75
ACAD. MED. S68, S70 (2000).
79. Troyen A. Brennan et al., The Role of Physician Specialty Board Certification Status in the
Quality Movement, 292 JAMA 1038, 1040 (2004)
80. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2006). The Secretary shall, in making the determinations under
paragraphs (1) and (9) of subsection (a), and for the purposes of promoting the effective, efficient,
and economical delivery of health care services, and of promoting the quality of services of the
type for which payment may be made under this title, enter into contracts with utilization and
quality control peer review organizations pursuant to part B of title XI of this Act. Id.
81. Michael A. Cassidy, Peer Review Immunity: History, Operation, and Recent Decisions-
Has HCQIA Accomplished Its Goals?, 5 HEALTH CARE L. MONITOR 3, 9 (2002).
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committee-a result of the loophole created by the physician's surrendering of
clinical privileges before an investigation is started in return for not being
reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank.82 Moreover, the data reviewed
by peer review organizations were often legally discoverable, and this lack of
anonymity and confidentiality tended to deter voluntary participation. Even when
peer review organizations identified problems, they were often unable to
implement solutions. Quality improvement organizations (QIO) have largely
supplanted peer review organizations, but they have yet to prove effective. 8 4
Another way to evaluate physician quality is through physician clinical
performance assessment (PCPA), defined as the "quantitative assessment of
physician performance based on the rates at which their patients experience
certain outcomes of care and/or the rates at which physicians adhere to
evidence-based processes of care."85 PCPA initiatives have been slow to win
acceptance by physicians on the grounds that they could be used as evidence in
malpractice litigation.86 The threshold for admission of such evidence in
malpractice litigation is high and the possibility that PCPA data will reach this
bar seems remote, at least for the vast majority of injury types that prompt
litigation. Unfortunately, some hospitals persist in separating patient safety, risk
management and quality-assurance initiatives, to the detriment of each. Hospital
incident reports have much the same shortcomings as the peer review process-
discoverability by plaintiffs' attorneys.88 Individuals also may be reluctant to file
reports out of fear that their employment might be jeopardized or that the
reported party might seek retribution. Further, such reports are generally not
protected by quality assurance privilege and are considered business records. 89
82. Barry R. Furrow et al., Professional Relationships in Health Care Enterprises Section I:
Staff Privileges and Hospital-Physician Contracts, in HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND
PROBLEMS 849, 859 (6th ed. 2008).
83. Ilene N. Moore et al., Rethinking Peer Review: Detecting and Addressing Medical
Malpractice Claims Risk, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1175, 1177-86 (2006).
84. Claire Snyder & Gerard Anderson, Do Quality Improvement Organizations Improve the
Quality of Care for Medicare Beneficiaries?, 293 JAMA 2900, 2905 (2005) (finding no statistically
significant difference in fourteen of fifteen quality indicators). But see William Rollow et al.,
Assessment of the Medicare Quality Improvement Organization Program, 145 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 342, 353 (2006) (finding nineteen of twenty-one hospital measures showed improvement).
85. Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Will Physician-Level Measures of Clinical Performance Be
Used in Medical Malpractice Litigation?, 295 JAMA 1831, 1831 (2006).
86. Id. at 1833 (noting, however, that PCPA actions could still be used against physicians in
other circumstances, for example, in proceedings by state licensure boards, hospital review
committees, and other adjudicatory bodies).
87. Id. at 1834.
88. Clemon W. Williams, Guide to Hospital Incident Reports, 10 HEALTH CARE MGMT. REV.
19, 23 (1985) (discussing the benefits of-and the limited protections available for-incident
reports).
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3. External Oversight
Although those best able-from a policy standpoint-to enhance patient
safety by decreasing adverse events are those within individual healthcare
entities, it has been known for nearly a century that physicians left to themselves
may not do all that can be done to maintain or improve patient care.90 There is
concern even in the surgical community that voluntary reporting to state
licensing boards (or even local credentials committees) is inconsistent.9'
Psychology may also underlie these behaviors, including fear about discussions
in an open forum, feelings of denial and infallibility.92
The patient safety concept of non-punitive reporting systems aimed at
getting doctors and other healthcare workers to disclose has gained momentum in
response to interest and pressure from a wide assortment of federal, state and
private entities: AHRQ,93 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention94 (CDC),
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services95 (CMS), the Joint Commission96
(TJC), American College of Surgeons97 (ACS), American Medical Association98
(AMA), American Hospital Association99 (AHA), American Society of
Anesthesiologists"o (ASA), and the Association of Operative Registered
90. Walter P. Bowers, Why Medical Malpractice?, 200 NEw ENG. J. MED. 93, 93 (1929) ("[I]n
the practice of medicine, there will always be, in the nature of the art, a large field in which if the
physician chooses to do wrong, no one but he will know about it until the day of Judgment.").
91. Hutter et al., supra note 70, at 621.
92. Id. at 622.
93. Daniel R. Neuspiel et al., Improving Error Reporting in Ambulatory Pediatrics with a
Team Approach, in I ADVANCES IN PATIENT SAFETY: NEw DIRECTIONS AND ALTERNATIVE
APPROACHES (Kerm Henriksen et al. eds., 2008), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/
downloads/pub/advances2/ vol l/Advances-Neuspiel 43.pdf.
94. William R. Jarvis, Infection Control and Changing Health-Care Delivery Systems, 7
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 170, 171 (2001).
95. CENTER OF MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, STATE OPERATIONS MANUAL APP. A
§482.25(b)(6)(2009), available at http://www.cms.gov/manuals/Downloads/soml07ap a hospitals
.pdf (noting that to improve incident reporting the facility should adopt a non-punitive system with
the focus on the system and not the involved health care professionals).
96. Betty Jessup & Michelle A. Koury, Joint Commission Accreditation: Leadership
Challenges and Advantages, 6 GRP. PRACT. J. 26, 27 (2009), available at www.jointcommission
.org/assets/1/1 8/getfile.pdf.
97. Christian Shalgian, Patient Pafety Initiatives Following the IOM Report, 86 BULL. AM. C.
SURGEONS 8, 9 (2001).
98. Letter from Michael D. Maves, Exec. Vice President, Am. Med. Ass'n, to the Adm'r of the
AHRQ 1 (Apr. 11, 2008), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/washington/patient-
safety-comment-letter.pdf.
99. AM. HosP. Ass'N, QUALITY ADVISORY: LONG-ANTICIPATED PATIENT SAFETY
ORGANIZATION PROGRAM BEGINS, available at http://www.aha.org/aha/advisory/2008/081029-
quality-adv.pdf.
100. Robert K. Stoelting, Response to the IOM Report, ANESTHESIA PATIENT SAFETY
FOUNDATION, http://www.apsf.org/aboutsafety.php (last visited Apr. 2, 2011).
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Nurses 01 (AORN). The rationale is that improved error reporting will make
future errors less common and less severe. Unreported errors are more likely to
be repeated and cause further injuries. 1 02
Commentators within the discipline of surgery as well as the community at
large have noted it is vital that physicians not use protected disclosure as an
excuse for avoiding responsibility for complications. 103 Private accreditation,
conducted by external associations, has helped alleviate concerns regarding the
"self-policing" nature and lack of oversight of most individual and institutional
mechanisms for enhancing patient safety.104 To address the issue of medical
injury, in 1995 the Joint Commission (TJC), at the time known as the Joint
Commission for Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, adopted a Sentinel
Events Policy (hereinafter known as "the Policy") for TJC-accredited healthcare
organizations. os The Policy requires that healthcare organizations report certain
adverse, or sentinel, events to TJC.'06 Although TJC representatives claim that
adherence to the Policy is voluntary, accreditation and the ability to provide
services to at least Medicare and Medicaid patients hinges upon adherence.'07
The healthcare organization must then perform a self-critical, systems-based root
cause analysis (RCA) of such events, and submit a report on the RCA along with
a corrective action plan to TJC for review and approval. 08
There are, however, characteristics of the Policy that are significant
obstacles to facilities interested in improving safety. As might be expected, the
Joint Commission approach to sentinel event disclosure has raised concerns
101 AORN Position Statement on Creating a Practice Environment of Safety, AORN (last
revised May 5, 2011), http://www.aorn.org/PracticeResources/AORNPositionStatements/Position
CreatingaPatientSafetyCulture.
102. THE JOINT COMMISSION, COMPREHENSIVE ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS: THE
OFFICIAL HANDBOOK (2011), http://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/6/2011_CAMH-SE.pdf
[hereinafter JOINT COMMISSION HANDBOOK].
103. Wachter & Provonost, supra note 29; see also Keith D. Lillemoe, To Err is Human, but
Should We Expect More from a Surgeon?, 237 ANNALS SURGERY 470, 471 (2003) (admonishing
surgeons to take responsibility for the safe conduct surgical procedures and the consequences of
errors).
104. Barry R. Furrow et al., supra note 82, at 191-94.
105. JOINT COMMISSION HANDBOOK, supra note 102, at SE-9.
106. Sentinel Events Policy and Procedures, THE JOINT COMMISSION, http://www.
jointcommission.org/Sentinel Event Policy andProcedures (last visited Apr. 2, 2011) (defining
reportable adverse events as an unexpected occurrence involving death or serious physical or
psychological injury, or the risk thereof). Serious injury specifically includes loss of limb or
function. The phrase, "or the risk thereof' includes any process variation for which a recurrence
would carry a significant chance of a serious adverse outcome. Such events are called "sentinel"
because they signal the need for immediate investigation and response. Accredited organizations
have some flexibility in defining "unexpected," "serious," and "the risk thereof." Id
107. Bryan A. Liang, Comment, Other People's Money: A Reply to the Joint Commission, 33
J. HEALTH L. 657, 659 (2000).
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regarding exposure during litigation and the use of information beyond its
intended patient safety purpose, such as TJC sanctions against healthcare
organizations.' 09 For example, if the Joint Commission receives an inquiry about
an accreditation decision of an organization that has experienced a reviewable
sentinel event, the organization's accreditation decision will be reported in the
usual manner without making reference to the sentinel event." 0 However, if an
inquirer specifically references the sentinel event, the Joint Commission will
acknowledge that it is aware of the event and currently is working or has worked
with the organization through the sentinel event review."' If the adverse report is
not made, or the root cause analysis is not considered acceptable after process has
been followed, TJC may place an organization progressively on Provisional
Accreditation, Conditional Accreditation, and finally, Preliminary Denial of
Accreditation.112 Ultimately, TJC may revoke the provider's accreditation, which
has major implications for reimbursement.' 3
The Joint Commission's accreditation program lacks the ability to identify
many patient safety problems, and it is difficult to determine whether the Joint
Commission's reporting policy has prevented adverse events-assuming such
prevention is the primary aim of the policy.'' 4 Since the inception of TJC's
unanticipated outcomes disclosure policy in 2001, the Elements of Performance
have become more exacting."' Therefore, although recognition of the systems
109. The Joint Commission, Sentinel Events: Approaches to Error Reduction and Prevention,
24 J. QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 175, 175 (1998).
110. JOINT COMMISSION HANDBOOK, supra note 102, at SE-14.
Ill . Id.
112. 2011 Accreditation Decision Rules, THE JOINT COMMISSION, http://e-dition.jcrinc.com/
Frame.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 2011).
113. A Look at the Joint Commission: CMS Approves Continued Deeming Authority, BULL.
AM. C. SURGEONS 49, 49 (2010) (reporting that the Department of Health and Human Services'
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has approved the continuation of deeming
authority for TJC's accreditation program, which has held deeming authority since the inception of
the Medicare program in 1965). The CMS designation means that hospitals accredited by The Joint
Commission applies to be "deemed" as meeting Medicare and Medicaid certification requirements.
CMS has found that The Joint Commission's standards for hospitals meet or exceed those
established by the Medicare and Medicaid program. The Joint Commission's hospital accreditation
program had previously been granted unique statutory deeming authority, but this unique status
ended with enactment of the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008.
Accreditation is voluntary and seeking deemed status through accreditation is an option, not a
requirement. If hospitals seeking Medicare approval choose to be surveyed by The Joint
Commission, all visits are unannounced. Id
114. Marlene R. Miller et al., Relationship Between Performance Measurement and
Accreditation: Implications for Quality of Care and Patient Safety, 20 AM. J. MED. QUALITY 239,
246 (2005) (noting few relationships between Joint Commission categorical accreditation and
Inpatient Quality Indicators or Patient Safety Indicators).
115. See THE JOINT COMMISSION, COMPREHENSIVE ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS
(2009), http://e-dition.jcrinc.com/Frame.aspx (last visited Dec. 29, 2009). Chapter on Rights and
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nature of error may represent progress in theory, the shame and blame
mechanisms used by the Joint Commission for enforcement represent at least one
step backwards. In combination with other medical efforts, progress toward error
reduction and patient safety promotion may be significantly retarded.'
In summary, three converging trends have pointed to enhancements in
patient safety as a source of reform for healthcare institutions. First, systems
analytic quality measurement methods are evolving as a way to quantitatively
assess guidelines for care. Second, there are mature methods for analysis of the
fundamentals of human performance and failures of health care as a system.
Lastly, external oversight of individual healthcare institutions by organizations,
such as the Joint Commission, help provide incentives to continuous patient
safety goals.
C. Medical Malpractice as Deterrence: A Failed Approach to Patient Safety
The present professional liability system is particularly controversial with
respect to whether it facilitates or hinders improvements in patient safety.
Implicit in the analysis of medical injury is a genuine desire to reduce such
injuries and make patients safer. Injuries are studied not only for their effects on
involved individuals, but also for the critical objective of establishing systems to
prevent similar injuries. An alternative to the patient safety approach of systems
analysis, improved human performance, and external oversight is medical
malpractice litigation for a presumed deterrence effect. Negligence tort law
claims of medical malpractice have been brought against physicians for nearly a
century. In New York City in 1910, 1.1% of tort cases were for medical
malpractice.' 17 In 1929, a physician was sued for malpractice once every four
Responsibilities, RI.01.02.01, states: "The hospital respects the patient's right to participate in
decisions about his or her care, treatment, and services." See also Id, Elements of Performance # 21
("The hospital informs the patient or surrogate decision-maker about unanticipated outcomes of
care, treatment, and services that relate to sentinel events considered reviewable by The Joint
Commission"); Id # 22 ("The licensed independent practitioner responsible for managing the
patient's care, treatment, and services, or his or her designee, informs the patient about
unanticipated outcomes of care, treatment, and services related to sentinel events when the patient
is not already aware of the occurrence or when further discussion is needed").
116. Ed Lovern, JCAHO's New Tell-All; Standards Require that Patients Know About Below-
Par Care, 31 MODERN HEALTHCARE 2, 3 (documenting that providers have expressed concerns
regarding provider liability for this new policy: e.g., every admission has unanticipated outcomes,
the standard will create awkwardness between hospitals and medical staffs, and "the hospital, by
definition, is now intruding into the patient-physician relationship if there is a [TJC] documentation
process required" for these disclosures).
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days. 18 In 1934 surgeons were cautioned "Secure consent before you operate."l" 9
The care with which clients are selected for medical malpractice litigation
notwithstanding, many suits are filed which do not support allegations of
negligence. In one reported study, a total of ninety-eight claims were filed against
151 healthcare providers.120 Of the ninety-eight claims, only forty-seven were
confirmed as due to treatment given in the given time period.121 Eight claims
established a negligent adverse event related to treatment, ten claims involved
hospitalization that had produced injuries not thought due to physician
negligence, and three cases exhibited some evidence of medical causation, but
not enough to pass the study's negligence criteria.12 2 Thus, twenty-six claims-
more than half-provided no evidence of medical injury or negligence.12 3
Lawyers are generally responsible only to their clients.124 Plaintiffs attorneys
generally take thirty to forty percent of damage awards, plus expenses, but
nothing if the jury finds for the defendant.12 5 Selecting the right client is therefore
a critical part of a plaintiffs firm's survival. To be found worthy of
representation, a variety of tests have been used, including a pattern of
negligence on the part of the defendant, how a case would likely stand up to a
jury, and the readiness of a firm to work on a case for years.126
As might be expected, the high threshold for filing a claim on behalf of
clients leads to a malpractice gap. 127 In the Harvard Medical Practice Study,
physician reviewers identified 1133 adverse events out of a sample of 31,429
medical records. Of the documented adverse events, 280 were deemed due to
negligence, but in these cases, only eight malpractice claims were filed
(1.53%).128 Another estimate (from 1984), relying on results of the statewide
118. Bowers, supra note 90, at 93 ("The situation at the present time is that about once every
four days some patient makes a claim against a physician seeking legal redress for alleged
malpractice.").
119. Halbert G. Stetson & John E. Moran, Malpractice Suits, Their Cause and Prevention, 210
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1381, 1381 (1934) ("[A]pproximately 20,000 suits have been brought against
physicians in the United States in the past five years.").
120. PAUL C. WElLER ET AL., Patient Injury and Litigation, in A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE:
MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 70 (1993).
121. Id.
122. Id at 71.
123. A. Russell Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events Due
to Negligence: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study III, 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 245, 248
tbl. 1 (1991).
124. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (2007) ("A lawyer, as a member of the legal
profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having
special responsibility for the quality ofjustice.").
125. BARRY WERTH, DAMAGES 44-45 (1998).
126. Id. at 53.
127. WEILER ET AL., supra note 120, at 69.
128. Localio et al., supra note 123, at 247.
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medical chart reviews, found that there were 3571 patient claims from 21,179
estimated negligent injuries (17%).129 When the authors expressed the claims
data in the form of ratios calculated from sampling weights, the chances that a
claim would be filed were not 17%, but 2%.130
As confirmation of the malpractice gap noted in the HMPS study, a similar
patient record review of claims filed in Utah and Colorado showed similar
results: eighteen malpractice claims were filed from a sample of 14,700 hospital
discharges.' 3 1 Fourteen of eighteen were made in the absence of negligence, and
ten in the absence of an adverse event. 132 The overall probability of a claim after
a negligent adverse event causing significant or major disability was 3.8%.
Patients who experienced negligent adverse events but did not sue shared social
and demographic factors including being poor, uninsured, beneficiaries of
Medicaid or Medicare, and seventy-five years of age or over.134
Arguably, not every negligent adverse event would produce a tort claim;
most physical disabilities studied in the HMPS were moderate, temporary, or
occurred in persons aged seventy or older whose monetary damages would be
comparatively low.' 35 Such injuries, even if negligent, might not meet a threshold
for litigation but would trigger a patient safety review when disclosed. The
impetus to study and correct systematic and individual errors would be to prevent
similar errors in the future-not a goal of a plaintiffs attorney-whose
responsibility is to represent an individual client.' 3 6 Apologies or other
statements-if made and admitted into evidence-could lower one of the other
major bars to successful litigation-causation-leading to decreased costs of
litigation and more filed claims.
The likely outcome of more disclosure is more litigation. There is little hard
data on this point, but surveys of injured patient's responses to disclosure are
suggestive. A survey of sixty-five experts predicted a 95% chance that claims
would increase, including a 60% chance that full disclosure of severe injuries
would double the annual number of claims nationwide and a 33% chance that
volume would increase at least threefold.13 7 Among patients, deterrent impact
129. WElLER ET AL., supra note 120, at 70.
130. Id at 73.
131. David M. Studdert et al., Negligent Care and Malpractice Claiming Behavior in Utah
and Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 250, 250 (2000).
132. Id. at 253.
133. Id. at 255.
134. Id. at 257.
135. Localio et al., supra note 123, at 247-48.
136. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, supra note 124.
137. David M. Studdert et al., Disclosure Of Medical Injury to Patients: An Improbable Risk
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was perceived to be greater: Disclosure would deter an average of 57% of
plaintiffs whose injuries were not due to negligence and prompt 17% of those
who were not inclined to file a claim, while there would be essentially no effect
on those whose injuries were adjudged due to negligence.' 38
There are data also to suggest that the poor, the uninsured, and the aged
suffer a disproportionate impact under malpractice litigation as currently
practiced.139 Lest the outlook on litigation as an approach to decreasing medical
injuries appear too bleak, it has been noted that the legal system operates more
accurately than the data suggest.140 While the absolute number of claims is
considerably larger than the absolute number of valid claims, the likelihood a
physician will be sued is greater if negligent treatment is believed to have
occurred than if not.' 4 ' Further, given the care with which clients are selected by
plaintiffs' attorneys, the success of malpractice claims is modest.142
Studdert has labeled malpractice law as "punitive, individual, [and]
adversarial," seeking to place blame and transform injury into money.143 This
system has its basis in the traditional paradigm of surgical care, which holds the
individual surgeon solely accountable. The "captain of the ship" paradigm has
enabled many great achievements in surgical care, but it has also probably
fostered a dangerous sense of infallibility. As a consequence, errors tend to be
equated with negligence, and questions of professional liability tend to involve
blaming individuals. Indeed, the very willingness of professionals to accept
responsibility for their actions makes it convenient to focus more on individual
errors than on collective ones; 144 an individual surgeon is a more satisfactory
target for the anger and grief of a patient or family than a nameless, faceless
healthcare organization. This is certainly not to say that surgeons should avoid
responsibility. Rather, the point is that focusing on the errors of individual
surgeons without addressing flaws in the underlying system does little to improve
health care, and increases the likelihood that errors will go under-reported.
Multivariate analyses of physician's answers to hypothetical vignettes showed
that a willingness to report errors was positively associated with a belief that such
reports improve quality of care, knowledge of the reporting process, and,
138. Id. at 219.
139. Helen R. Burstin et al., Do the Poor Sue More? A Case-Control Study of Malpractice
Claims and Socioeconomic Status, 270 JAMA 1697, 1700 (1993).
140. WEILER ET AL., supra note 120, at 74.
141. Id
142. THOMAS H. COHEN, TORT BENCH AND JURY TRIALS IN STATE COURTS, 2005, (2009),
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/tbjtsc05.pdf (reporting 15% of bench and jury
trials disposed of in state courts in 2005 were medical malpractice cases; of these, 22.7% had
verdicts for the plaintiffs, with an average verdict of $679,000).
143. David Studdert, Medical Malpractice, 350 NEw ENG. J. MED. 283, 287 (2004).
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importantly, an expectation of forgiveness.14 5 Where culpable, mechanisms of
discipline should be (and are) being implemented by healthcare organizations.146
Another notable flaw in the liability process is that judgments of causality or
fault are backward-looking, and prone to hindsight bias, which can prejudice
experts' assessments of quality of care. This tendency was illustrated by a study
of anesthetic care in which knowledge of differences in outcome (temporary
versus permanent disability) exerted a significant effect on the opinion rendered
by the reviewer.147 Hindsight bias focuses too narrowly on adverse outcomes and
pays insufficient attention to the processes of care. Yet another defect of the
liability process is that it can be financially devastating for physicians,14 8 often
adversely affecting their problem-solving abilities. To the extent that experience
with or fear of a lawsuit deters efforts at quality improvement by encouraging
defensive medicine, it adds very little value to health care and is
counterproductive from a cost standpoint. 4 9 Lastly, the majority of expenditures
in the malpractice system go towards litigation; "The overhead costs of
malpractice litigation are exorbitant."' 50 Many believe that major reform of the
professional liability system is a prerequisite for achieving any significant
improvements in quality.' 5  Undoubtedly, tort reform is highly desirable;
however, the real prerequisite for improving identification and correction of
system failures is the provision of increased protection for privileged discussion
of such failures.
Organized medicine has mounted vigorous resistance to financially driven
controls imposed under managed care without clinical justification, but is still in
the initial stages of adopting scientifically based practice guidelines and effective
accountability measures.' 5 2 A transparent discussion of errors, complications, and
deaths was reported not to lead to an increased risk of lawsuit in the trauma
setting.' 53 The improvements in patient safety achieved by anesthesiologists
145. Lauris C. Kaldjian et al., Reporting Medical Errors To Improve Patient Safety: A Survey
of Physicians in Teaching Hospitals, 168 ARCHIVES INTERN MED. 40, 43 (2008).
146. Wachter & Pronovost, supra note 29, at 1405 tbl. 2.
147. Robert A. Caplan et al., Effect of Outcome on Physician Judgments ofAppropriateness of
Care, 265 JAMA 1957, 1960 (1991).
148. Nicholas P. Lang, Professional Liability, Patient Safety, and First Do No Harm, 182 AM.
J. SURGERY 537, 540 (2001); see also Barry M Manuel, Double-Digit Premium Hikes: The Latest
Crisis in Professional Liability, 86 BuLL. AM. C. SURGEONS 19, 19-20 (2001).
149. David M. Studdert et al., Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk Specialist Physicians in
a Volatile Malpractice Environment, 293 JAMA 2609, 2616 (2005).
150. David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical
Malpractice Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024, 2024 (2006).
151. David M. Studdert et al., Medical Malpractice, 350 NEw ENG. J. MED. 283, 288. (2004).
152. Peter P. Budetti, Tort Reform and the Patient Safety Movement: Seeking Common
Ground, 293 JAMA 2660, 2661 (2005).
153. Ronald M. Stewart et al., Transparent and Open Discussion ofErrors Does Not Increase
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argue for the benefits of such accountability. Instead of pushing for laws to
protect against patients' malpractice claims, anesthesiologists focused on
improving patient safety. As a result, anesthesiologists paid less for malpractice
insurance, adjusted for inflation, than they did twenty years prior.154
II. APOLOGY LAW: COMMON LAW AND STATUTE
Case law is well settled on the effect of disclosures by physicians of
admissions of liability for various injuries sustained by patients. When a
physician makes such an admission, the plaintiff tends to prevail.155 Many states
have enacted "apology laws," which are intended to mitigate the conflict that a
physician faces when trying to meet the patient's desire (and perhaps need) for an
apology while avoiding self-incrimination. Apology laws change the traditional
rule on admissibility of evidence by declaring that apologies are inadmissible in
civil actions arising from alleged medical errors.15 6 Apology laws purport to
protect apologies from being entered into evidence, but these protective laws can
be separated into those that do or do not protect accompanying acknowledgments
of fault. For example, Colorado's apology statute addresses all civil actions
arising out of "unanticipated outcome[s] of medical care" and makes
inadmissible as evidence of an admission of liability statements "expressing
apology, fault, sympathy, commiseration, compassion, or a general sense of
benevolence."' 57 In contrast, an Indiana statute protects the apology, or
"communication of sympathy," but not a "statement of fault," even if made
within the context of the apology. 5 8
A. Why Apologizing Won't Work
His mother said:
an open M&M conference, of 412 cases, only seven claims were filed and of these, six were
surprises-having not been presented).
154. Brian A. Liang, Clinical Assessment of Malpractice Case Scenarios in an Anesthesiology
Department, 11 J. CLINICAL ANESTHESIOLOGY 267, 270 (1999).
155. Giles v. Brookwood Health Servs., Inc., 5 So. 3d 533 (Ala. 2008); Quibodeaux v. Med.
Center of Sw. La., 707 So. 2d 1380 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1998); Woods v. Zeluff, 158 P.3d 552 (Utah
App. 2007); Phinney v. Vinson, 605 A.2d 849 (Vt. 1992).
156. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 4318 (b) (2006) ("Any and all statements, writings,
gestures, or affirmations made by a health care provider or an employee of a health care provider
that express apology (other than an expression or admission of liability or fault), sympathy,
compassion, condolence, or benevolence relating to the pain, suffering, or death of a person as a
result of an unanticipated outcome of medical care, that is made to the person, the person's family,
or a friend of the person or of the person's family, with the exception of the admission of liability
or fault, are inadmissible in a civil action that is brought against a health care provider.")
157. CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-135 (West 2003).
158. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-43.5-1-3 to -5 (West 2006).
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-0, Stephen will apologise.
Dante said:
-0, if not, the eagles will come and pull out his eyes.'59
1. Apology: A Definition
A rational use of apology in the medical care setting requires a careful
consideration of what constitutes an apology, and how it is different from other
acknowledgements that a patient has suffered. There is a substantial medico-legal
literature on the use of apology, and the majority view is that physicians should
apologize to patients who have experienced medical injury. 160 Commentators
have treated the term "apology" rather cursorily, seemingly without a clear
understanding of what the offer of an apology entails linguistically, if not
morally.161 To obligate clinicians to engage in such endeavors is therefore naive
and possibly counterproductive to the goal of patient safety.
Apology is defined as "a written or spoken expression of one's regret,
remorse, or sorrow for having insulted, failed, injured, or wronged another." 62
Apologies have been operationally defined as "admissions of blameworthiness
and regret for an undesirable event, for example, a transgression, a harmful act,
an embarrassing incident."l6 3 Such definitions leave no doubt as to the fact that
apologies, as illocutionary acts, include a statement of fault.' 64 The consensus as
to the requirement of admission of fault is also confirmed by empirical studies on
the uses of apology in legal settlements. Apologies in the fullest sense include
acceptance of responsibility.165
159. JAMES JOYCE, A PORTRAIT OF THE ARTIST AS A YOUNG MAN 2 (Easton Press ed. 1977)
(1914).
160 Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009, 1014-46
(1999); Deborah L. Levi, The Role ofApology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165 1167 (1997);
Daniel Shuman, The Role of Apology in Tort Law, 83 JUDICATURE 180, 180 (2000); Lee Taft,
Apology and Medical Mistake: Opportunity or Foil?, 14 ANNALS HEALTH L. 55, 62-67 (2005); Lee
Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification ofApology, 109 YALE L. J. 1135 (2000).
161. Doug Wojcieszak et al., The Sorry Works! Coalition: Making the Case for Full
Disclosure, 32 JOINT COMM'N J. ON QUALITY & PATIENT SAFETY 344, 345 (2006) (conflating full
disclosure and apology, noting apologies can both acknowledge and disavow responsibility).
162. Apology Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/apology
(last visited Jan. 8, 2010).
163. Bruce W. Darby & Barry R. Schlenker, Children's Reactions to Apologies, 43 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL., 742, 743 (1982).
164. KENT BACH, Speech Acts and Pragmatics, in BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LANGUAGE, 147 (Michael Devitt & Richard Hanley eds., 2006).
165. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination, 102
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Apologies have been described as a form of remedial work, "a gesture
through which an individual splits himself into two parts: the part that is guilty of
an offense and the part that dissociates itself from the delict and affirms a belief
in the offended rule." 6 6 Further, an apology brings heavy moral approbation
down on the offender, and
[h]as several elements: expression of embarrassment and chagrin; clarification
that one knows what conduct had been expected and sympathizes with the
application of negative sanction; verbal rejection, repudiation, and disavowal of
the wrong way of behaving along with vilification of the self that so behaved;
espousal of the right way and an avowal henceforth to pursue that course;
performance of penance and the volunteering of restitution. 7
The apology performs a function by which "an individual splits himself into
two parts, the part that is guilty of an offense and the part that dissociates itself
from the delict and affirms a belief in the offended rule."1 6 8 In order for a "full
apology" to be performed, the speaker must acknowledge responsibility for
having committed some offending act, and he or she must express regret about
the offense.169 The admission of responsibility for the adverse event is a
necessary feature of an apology because it conveys to the listener that the speaker
is aware of the social norms that have been violated, and therefore conveys that
the speaker will be able to avoid the offense in future interactions. 170
The form of an apology is also varied; by saying "I apologize," one makes
an explicit performative utterance.' 7' Utterances may be considered to be
but does not admit responsibility). Partial apologies are contrasted with "full apologies," in which
the offender both expresses sympathy and accepts responsibility. Id.
166. Erving Goffman, Remedial Interchanges, in RELATIONS IN PUBLIC: MICROSTUDIES OF THE
PUBLC ORDER 109 (1971) (describing the function of remedial work as "to change the meaning
that otherwise might be given to an act, transforming what could be seen as offensive into what can
be seen as acceptable" and setting forth three types of remedial work; accounts, apologies and
requests).
167. Id. at 113.
168. Id.
169. Bruce Fraser, On Apologising, in CONVERSATIONAL ROUTINE 261 (Florian Coulmas ed.,
1981).
170. Steven J. Scher & John M. Darley, How Effective Are the Things People Say To
Apologize? Effects of the Realization of the Apology Speech Act, 26 J. PSYCHOLINGUISTIC REs. 127,
128 (1997); see also Jeremy C. Anderson et al., Influence of Apologies and Trait Hostility on
Recovery from Anger, 29 J. BEHAV. MED. 347, 348 (2006) (defining the elements of a "genuine"
apology to include six verbal components: first, an explicit expression of remorse; second, a
specific statement of why one feels remorse and being sorry for the right thing; third, one must
accept responsibility for one's actions; fourth, a truthful explanation for the offensive behavior
without trying to excuse the offence and shirk responsibility; fifth, a promise of forbearance-a
statement that the offensive behavior is not reflective of the offender's true character, therefore the
victim can trust the behavior will not recur- and, sixth, an offer of restitution).
171. BACH, supra note 164, at 148.
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apologies without the benefit of an explicit statement.172 Apology utterances have
been further classified into three distinct levels of action beyond the act of
utterance itself: the act of saying something (I apologize), what one does in
saying it (conveying the adverse event to the patient), and the outcome effected
by saying it (patient accepts or does not accept the apology). These are dubbed
locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts, respectively.' 73
Apologies are therefore different from other statements expressing
responsibility, liability, sympathy, commiseration, condolence, compassion or a
general sense of benevolence that may be rendered inadmissible as admissions or
statements against interest in some state statutes. Psycholinguistic experts have
classified apologies and suggested a number of elements which may be included
in an apology: illocutionary force indicating devices (for example, "I'm sorry,"
or "I apologize"), an explanation of the cause which brought about the wrong, an
offer of repair, a promise of forbearance, and an expression of the speaker's
responsibility for the offense.17 4
2. Points to Consider in Offering Apologies: Not as Easy as One Might
Think
Coulmas has described apologies as reactive, making reference to an object
of regret.'75 All apology strategies are intended to convey important information
to the hearer (e.g., patient or family) about the speaker (e.g., the physician),
improving perceptions about the speaker, reducing the intended sanctions,
increasing emotions of remorse or regret attributed to the speaker, and enhancing
the appropriateness of the apology.'76Apologies with no acknowledgement of
responsibility are not indebting and can merge into other statements, such as
expressions of sympathy. 77
There are several strategies for apologizing in which the speaker explicitly
172. Id. at 149 (noting one can apologize without explicitly using the performative phrase "I
apologize" as a "force-indicating device"). Accordingly, Bach believes here is no theoretically
important difference between apologizing explicitly (by saying, "I apologize") and doing it
inexplicitly. Id.
173. JOHN LANGSHAW AUSTIN, How To Do THINGS WITH WORDS 94 (2d ed. 1962).
174. Scher & Darley, supra note 170, at 130.
175. Florian Coulmas, "Poison to Your Soul": Thanks and Apologies Contrastively Viewed, in
CONVERSATIONAL ROUTINE, 75-76 (Florian Coulmas ed., 1981) (distinguishing objects of regret as
"a kind of damage, annoyance, or inconvenience which is predictable vs. unpredictable; indebting
vs. not indebting"). All medical adverse events occur ex post and it is only these with which the
current paper is concerned.
176. Scher & Darley, supra note 170, at 130.
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states that an apology is at issue. Apology strategies that actually use the word
"apology" leave little likelihood that the speaker's intentions are other than to
apologize although only in the first, the performative form (e.g., "I hereby
apologize . . ."), does she actually say that what she is doing is apologizing. Other
choices, such as expressing the obligation to apologize, offering to apologize, or
requesting the hearer accept one's apology do not technically mean the speaker is
apologizing.17 Notice that in none of these four strategies does the speaker
explicitly say that she is responsible for or that she regrets or is remorseful for the
object of regret, though these two points are certainly contained in the meaning
of the words apology or apologize. Although an illocutionary force indicating
device, an apology such as "I apologize" or "Pardon me," unaccompanied by an
expression of remorse, does not convey the required information about the
emotional state of the speaker.
Remorse, responsibility, and regret are the primary information conveyed by
an apology.180 Expressing regret for the offense with phrases such as "I'm sorry
for . . ." or "I regret that I . . ." the speaker explicitly expresses regret for the
offense as well as explicitly acknowledges responsibility for the object of regret
itself.'8 ' Goffman has said as much: "Whether one runs over one's sentence,
time, dog or body, one is more or less reduced to saying some variant of 'I'm
sorry."' 1 82 Remorse also serves to deflect negative personality judgments and
other reactions from the transgressor.3
Other strategic decisions are whether to request forgiveness for the offense
or to explicitly acknowledge responsibility.184 By acknowledging responsibility
alone or requesting forgiveness the speaker is not explicitly expressing regret. An
offer of compensation has an obvious connection to the remedial function of an
apology. The speaker certainly implies, but does not make explicit, that she has
some responsibility and feels regret by saying "what can I do to amend?"' 8 5 It is
178. Fraser, supra note 169, at 263 (describing four forms of explicit apology: first,
announcing that one is apologizing "I (hereby) apologize for . . ."; second, stating one's obligation
to apologize "I must apologize for . . ."; third, offering to apologize "I (hereby) offer my apology
for . . ."; I would like to offer my apology to you for . . ."; fourth, requesting the hearer accept an
apology (e.g., "Please accept my apology for. . ."; "Let me apologize for. . ."; "I would appreciate
it if you would accept my apology for. . .").
179. Fraser, supra note 169, at 263-64.
180. Scher & Darley, supra note 170, at 129-30.
181. Fraser, supra note 169, at 264.
182. GOFFMAN, supra note 166, at 117.
183. Scher & Darley, supra note 170, at 130.
184. Fraser, supra note 169, at 263 (giving examples of requesting forgiveness for the offense
such as "Please excuse me for . . ." "Pardon me for .. ." I beg your pardon for . .. " "Forgive me
for . . ." and examples acknowledging responsibility for the offending act such as "That was my
fault" or "Doing that was a dumb thing to do").
185. Fraser, supra note 169, at 264.
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an offer to try to correct the situation, to try to partially restore the patient to her
pre-adverse event condition, which is often difficult if not impossible, and in
which case some form of monetary compensation is all that can be provided (for
example, cost-free care of the complicating injury). Rarely, however, does the
physician have the fiduciary authority on behalf of the healthcare system to make
such an offer to repair things so that it is as if the transgression had not occurred.
As the physician has no ability to obligate an offer of compensation, one of the
purported reasons for the apology to serve as a form of symbolic function of
punishment of the "guilty self' cannot take place.186
3. Malpractice Insurance Coverage and the Physician as Independent
Contractor
Among the practical issues that must be understood prior to any
consideration of an apology for medical adverse events are the effect on a
physician's malpractice coverage, and any risks to the physician as an
independent contractor. Rarely in the healthcare setting is sustaining an adverse
event as simple as A injures B, so A must apologize to B. Does the making of an
apology void the physician's malpractice insurance coverage? Does apologizing
place the physician at risk to be fired at will?
The concept of moral hazard suggests that insured physicians might feel free
to apologize, or worse, take fewer precautions to protect patient safety. Why not?
The insurance company, not the physician, may be perceived as liable under such
circumstances. However, liability insurance may impose upon the insured a
general duty of cooperation with the insurance company to defend claims.187
Some liability insurance policies also specifically prohibit the insured from
voluntarily assuming liability.18 8 Cohen suggests two questions need be answered
prior to the giving of an apology, both of which are part of a "full apology," as
noted above.' 89 First, is an insured's apology considered a breach of the insured's
general duty of cooperation? Second, would the insured's apology be taken as
assuming liability, again leading to breach? 90
For the insurer to prevail in assertions of breach in the general duty of
cooperation, the insurer must show bad faith-hard to prove in the absence of
some collusion between the physician and patient (such as an attempt to defraud
and share profits).'91 If, instead of apologizing, the insured simply recounts the
186. Scher & Darley, supra note 170, at 130.
187. Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients To Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 1009, 1025
(1999).
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facts as known, the insured is offering only evidence that she would likely have
to disclose in deposition or at trial.' 92 A harder case for the insured wishing to
apologize is when the insurance contract specifically forbids the insured from
accepting liability. Would a physician who apologizes and assumes liability
without the insurance company's approval void coverage? There are few cases
on this, usually arising from automobile accidents, and the law is not well
settled.193 One distinction that has been drawn by courts is that statements by the
insured that truthfully admit fault may not void coverage, while statements that
assume financial liability will void coverage.194
B. Case Law
Case law on the legal liability of apologies and whether physicians'
statements to patients may be admitted as party admissions is variable.195 On
balance such statements are more likely to be admitted into evidence against
physicians to reverse a non-suit than not:
Under well-established rules we must . . . resolve every conflict in their
testimonies in favor of plaintiff, consider every inference which can
reasonably be drawn and every presumption which can fairly be deemed
to arise in support of plaintiff, and accept as true all evidence adduced
direct and indirect which tends to sustain plaintiff s case.19 6
Physician statements have been allowed in as evidence based on hearsay
exceptions, or out of court statements issued to prove the truth of the matter
asserted; establishing medical malpractice as defining the standard of care,
breach of the standard, and causation, as discussed below. In Colbert v.
Georgetown, statements attributed to, but denied by the defendant, were held to
be admissions establishing a prima facie case of malpractice, to demonstrate that
the standard of care was breached, and to reverse a summary judgment in favor
of the defendants.' 97 In Snyder v. Pantaleo, statements by the physician defendant
192. Id
193. See, e.g., Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of "No-Consent- To-Settlement"
Exclusion Clauses in Automobile Insurance Policies, 18 A.L.R. (1982) (citing cases where courts
have variously upheld and rejected such clauses).
194. 8 JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4780 (1981)
(admonishing "a policy provision [against assuming liability] does not prohibit the insured from
giving the injured person a truthful explanation of the accident and circumstances thereof").
195. Wei, supra note 18, at I10.
196. Lashley v. Koerber, 156 P.2d 441, 442 (Cal. 1945) (considering whether the judgment of
nonsuit was proper).
197. Colbert v. Georgetown Univ., 623 A.2d 1244, 1253 (D.C. 1993), rev'den banc, 641 A.2d
469 (D.C. 1994) (citing statements such as decision first to perform lumpectomy rather than a
mastectomy caused an "enhanced risk of a very high nature;" that defendant conceded to plaintiff
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to another were used as expert testimony as to breach of standard of care.' 9 8
In a California wrongful death suit, Sheffield v. Runner,199 the defendant
stated, regarding a patient with bacterial pneumonia, "I should have put her in the
hospital." 200 The court held that a physician's statements could not only prove
liability, but also be used as expert testimony demonstrating breach of standard
of care. According to the testimony of the plaintiffs husband, the defendant then
told plaintiff "to . . . have an X-ray taken, stating that he should have done it in
the beginning . . . . I know, it is not yourfault, Mrs. Lashley, it is all my own."20 1
An Oklahoma case, Robertson v. LaCroix, also held that a surgeon's statements
communicated more than mistaken judgment and constituted an admission of
negligence during an operation. 20 2 In Woronka v. Sewall, the plaintiff filed suit
for burns she received on her buttocks while giving birth.203 The defendant doctor
examined the patient two days later and allegedly said, "My God, what a mess;
my God, what happened here . . . . It is a darn shame to have this happen," and
sympathized with the patient for a "very hard delivery and it was a burning
shame to get that on top of it, and it was because of negligence when they were
upstairs." 204 In Wickoff v. James, the court held that defendant doctor's statement
to the plaintiffs husband "Boy, I sure made a mess out of things today, didn't I,
Warren?" could be interpreted to establish a prima facie case of negligence, and a
nonsuit in favor of the defendants was reversed.205
In Greenwood v. Harris, a gynecologist, upon finding that a presumed tumor
that he had performed "the wrong operation;" and that he "had forgotten" lumpectomy was
inappropriate for multicentric cancer); see also Abbey v. Jackson, 483 A.2d 330, 333-34 (D.C.
1984) (holding that plaintiffs may elicit from the defendants or their agents the expert opinion
necessary to establish a prima facie case of malpractice).
198. Snyder v. Pantaleo, 122 A.2d 21, 23 (Conn. 1956) (holding that defendant radiologist's
statement to the deceased's family physician was expert testimony of the standard of care and its
breach).
199. Sheffield v. Runner, 328 P.2d. 828, 829 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (finding that the case
was sufficient to reverse a nonsuit judgment by the trial court and submit to the jury).
200. Id.
201. Lashley v. Koerber, 156 P.2d at 442 (finding that a jury could reasonably conclude that
the alleged admission of the defendant physician to plaintiff constituted breach of the standard of
care).
202. Robertson v. LaCroix, 534 P.2d 17, 22 (Ct. App. Okla. 1975) (holding that physician's
statement that he "just made a mistake and got over too far" during surgery was prima facie
evidence of the standard of care and its breach).
203. Woronka v. Sewall, 69 N.E.2d 581, 582 (Mass. 1946) ("[The defendant's] mere use of
the word 'negligence' does not supply the essential elements to justify a necessary finding of
liability on his part," and that "much more is contained in the admissions than the mere use of that
word.").
204. Id
205. Wickoff v. James, 324 P.2d 661, 663-64 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (defining "mess," the
court looked to Webster's New International Dictionary, Roget's Thesaurus, and A. Partridge,
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was in fact a three-and-one-half months pregnancy, earnestly disclosed the
following: "Your wife is approximately three to three and a half months
pregnant, this is a terrible thing I have done, I wasn't satisfied with the lab report,
she did have signs of being pregnant. I should have had tests run again, I should
have made some other tests," and, "I am sorry." The Supreme Court of
Oklahoma found that these statements indicated a prima facie case of malpractice
and reversed the trial court's decision sustaining a demurrer.2 06
The use of physician statements not only serves to allow appellate courts to
reverse pre-trial judgments for the defense, but also to reverse directed verdicts
or have a case remanded for re-trial after a jury has returned a verdict. In Wooten
v. Curry, a plaintiffs husband, on finding his wife's vagina closed after a
hysterectomy, related the following statement regarding a conversation with the
gynecologist defendant: "That is the only thing I have to go by, just what he told
me. That was the only thing that looked like it caused it. He said he was sorry it
happened and could have probably have avoided it if he had checked on her as he
should." 20 7 In Woods v. Zeluff statements made by defendant to the plaintiff
during a post-operative visit were excluded as unfairly prejudicial by the trial
court: "I jumped the gun," "I've missed something," and "I don't think we should
have done this surgery."208
Some courts have found that a physician's out of court statements, including
apologies, are insufficient to establish the standard of care or its breach, as
discussed below. Unfortunately, statements made by physicians that are not held
sufficient to establish the standard of care-or its breach-are extremely difficult
to distinguish from those which are sufficient. In general, courts seem divided on
whether expert testimony beyond that of statements attributed to the defendant
can establish negligence, standard of care, or breach. In Jeffries v. Murdock, the
plaintiffs statement regarding his conversation with a defendant physician
included the following: "And I said, 'Well, how did this all happen?' He said,
'I'm sorry, I accidentally cut the nerve to your vocal cord."' 2 09 The court held
that the significance of the defendant's alleged statement was negated by the
testimony of defense expert witnesses and by the plaintiffs failure to present any
evidence to the contrary. In Senesac v. Associates in Obstetrics & Gynecology,
the plaintiff testified that shortly after the operation the defendant "admitted that
206. Greenwood v. Harris, 362 P.2d 85, 88 (Okla. 1961).
207. Wooten v. Curry 362 S.W.2d 820, 822 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962) (holding that the statement
of the defendant in the absence of any explanation made a prima facie case of negligence and
proximate cause, and reversing a directed verdict for the defense).
208. Woods v. Zeluff, 158 P.3d. 552, 554 (Utah Ct. App. 2007) (holding that the trial court
erred by excluding, as unfairly prejudicial, post-operative statements allegedly made by Dr. Zeluff
and that such error warranted a new trial).
209. Jeffries v. Murdock, 701 P.2d. 451, 453 (Or. Ct. App. 1985).
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she had made a mistake." 21 0 The Supreme Court of Vermont affirmed a
defendant's motion for summary judgment by holding that, while a defendant's
statement might have been admissible, it alone was insufficient to meet plaintiff's
burden of production.2 1 1 A plaintiff alleged the defendant said he was told by a
second doctor after re-operation on the plaintiffs prostate gland that the
defendant had performed an "inadequate resection" and apologized to plaintiff
"for his failure to do so." 2 12 In Giles v. Brookwood Health Services, Inc., the
defendant was sued for removing a normal right rather than a diseased left
ovary.2 13 The defendant admitted that the plaintiffs husband Giles "was
absolutely right, that it was the left side that should have been removed. [He said]
'I am so sorry . . . ."'214 However, on appeal, the court held:
Giles submitted no expert testimony indicating that Dr. Perry was in any way
negligent with regard to her medical care and treatment . . . Therefore, no
genuine issue of material fact exists as to Giles's malpractice claims against Dr.
Perry, and Dr. Perry is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on those
claims.215
In Airasian v. Shaak, evidence of both the doctor's observation and his
statement admitting fault was ruled inadmissible at trial under a statute
precluding admission of statements or conduct expressing regret, apology,
mistake, or error.216
Some courts have held that physicians' out-of-court statements describing
adverse events as "mistakes" or "accidental" are not enough to establish a prima
facie case in the absence of expert testimony. In Maxwell v. Women's Clinic,
P.A., the court held that, in the absence of expert testimony, the plaintiffs
statement and act of non-billing for the surgery together would not be sufficient
210. Senesac v. Assocs. in Obstetrics & Gynecology, 449 A.2d 900, 903 (Vt. 1982) (holding
that the asserted statements of defendant "made a mistake, that she was sorry, and that it [the
perforation of the uterus] had never happened before" did not establish a departure from the
standard of care).
211. Phinney v. Vinson, 605 A.2d 849, 849 (Vt. 1992) (holding that while defendant's
statement may have been admissible, it was insufficient by itself to meet plaintiffs' burden under 12
V.S.A. § 1908 (1975)).
212. Id.
213. Giles v. Brookwood Health Services, Inc., 5 So. 3d 533, 540 (Ala. 2008) (holding that in
the light most favorable to plaintiff, defendant's apologies did not constitute expert testimony that
he injured Giles by breaching the standard of care).
214. Id. at 540.
215. Id. at 548-49.
216. Airasian v. Shaak, 657 S.E.2d 600, 601 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (disallowing a defendant
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to create the required inference about failing to meet the community standard.217
In Locke v. Pachtman, a gynecology resident acting under the supervision of an
attending surgeon, who was not present, broke a needle in the plaintiffs tissues.
The resident defendant made statements that plaintiff argued established a prima
facie case of negligence: "I knew that needle was too small when the new scrub
nurse handed it to me. It wasn't her fault because she was new, but I chose to use
it anyway and it's my fault and I am really sorry . ... " In a federal diversity
case, Sutton v. Calhoun, the appellate court held it proper for the lower court to
refuse to give an instruction to the jury that if the "mistake" statement was made
it was an admission of negligence. 2 19 Lastly, in Quickstad v. Tavenner, the
appellate court held that the defendant's statements were not enough to support a
prima facie case for the plaintiff after a needle was retained in the chest cavity
during thoracentesis. 220 In some instances, written documents or statements
provided by the physician-whether spontaneously or in response to a patient's
request after an "apology" or other verbal act is made-have been held
inadmissible.22 1
In some of the cases discussed above, statements attributed to defendant
physicians were denied, but still admitted into evidence. In some circumstances
the statements were admitted as proofs of negligence, and in some cases, not. As
a result, circumspection in disclosure to patients is still advised. The idea is that
this should reassure physicians and allow them to feel safer in apologizing to
patients. But to follow this logic is to ignore the much deeper problem that the
kind of apologies that these laws seek to protect are ones that are given in the
context of adverse events and medical errors. Apology laws will not make case
law more predictable by barring admission of apologies into evidence; as the
cases cited above show, there is a particularized fact assessment that is difficult
to reconcile with any given state statute.
217. Maxwell v. Women's Clinic, P.A., 625 P.2d 407, 408 (Idaho 1981) (quoting the
plaintiff s husband as testifying, "[A]nd he said, the way I remember it, he said, I obviously messed
up on the first one, and another surgery has to be done to repair the damage").
218. Locke v. Pachtman, 521 N.W.2d 786, 789 (Mich. 1994) (holding that while the
statements may have indicated defendant's belief that she made a mistake, a jury could not
reasonably infer from those statements alone that defendant's actions did not conform to standards
of professional practice).
219. Sutton v. Calhoun, 593 F.2d 127, 127 (10th Cir. 1979) (involving family members of the
plaintiff who alleged that after the operation the defendant came to them and said he had "made a
mistake," that he should not have cut the common bile duct).
220. Quickstad v. Tavenner, 264 N.W. 436, 437 (Minn. 1936) (involving a plaintiff who
alleged the doctor stated that "he broke the needle"; he "should have used a stronger needle"; he
"shouldn't have done it"; and would "never try it again").
221. Smith v. Karen S. Reisig, M.D., Inc., 686 P.2d 285, 289 (Okla. 1984) (holding that the
defendant doctor's statement in the medical record that injury to plaintiffs bladder was
"inadvertent" was not an admission of negligence).
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Further, apology laws are not necessary to enable doctors to deliver
statements of empathy and understanding in the everyday situation; physicians
frequently and without hesitation may say to their patients that they are sorry that
their patients are experiencing pain or suffering. These are not the scenarios with
which the apology laws are concerned. By attempting to bar the introduction of
statements by physicians communicating with patients who have been injured,
apology laws are supposed to encourage doctors to speak up when medical errors
occur-to push doctors to engage in apologies as part of disclosure. In this way,
apology laws do not tackle the more fundamental issue: that physicians and
healthcare institutions are obliged to disclose of medical errors.
C. How Exactly Does "Sorry " Work?
The concept of disclosure and apology gained momentum based on reports
from the Lexington Veterans Affairs Medical Center (LVAMC) a decade ago.
After LVAMC lost two major malpractice cases in the mid-1980s, to the tune of
$1.5 million, its leadership started taking a more proactive approach in
identifying and investigating incidents that could result in litigation. The shift in
focus evolved into an organization-wide full disclosure policy and procedure.222
The policy is excerpted in part:
The [disclosure] meeting is with the chief of staff, the facility attorney, the
quality manager, the quality management nurse, and sometimes the facility
director. At the meeting, all of the details are provided as sensitively as
possible, including the identities of persons involved in the incident (who are
notified before the meeting). Emphasis is placed on the regret of the institution
and the personnel involved and on any corrective action that was taken to
prevent similar events. 223
An analysis of claims experience at LVAMC, compared to thirty-five other
similar VAMCs, showed that Lexington was in the top quartile of claims but the
bottom quartile in payments.224 Recently, out of seven veterans who were
notified by VA of substandard eye care, three have filed suit.225 The LVAMC
experience was also tried in the academic setting at the University of Michigan,
and reported survey results suggest physicians and plaintiffs' attorneys alike were
222. Steve S. Kraman et al., John M. Eisenberg Patient Safety Awards, Advocacy: The
Lexington Veterans Affairs Medical Center, 28 JoINT COMM'N J. QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 646, 647
(2002).
223. Steve S. Kraman and Ginny Hamm, Risk Management: Extreme Honesty May Be the
Best Policy, 131 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 963, 967 (1999).
224. Id. at 965.
225. John Maa & Kristen Hedstrom, College Advocates for Ensuring Quality Eye Care for
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satisfied with the approach.22 6 Recent experience with the Michigan data further
suggests that a disclosure-with-offer policy has decreased both claims and
payments; however, the precise role of apology is not clearly defined.227 The
authors note that causality was not established due to study design,228 but during
the latter part of the study malpractice claims in Michigan generally declined.229
The authors also note that the University of Michigan Health System has a closed
staff with a captive insurance company that assumes legal responsibility; the
findings might not apply to other health systems.230 Settlements were generally
made in the institution's name; consequently, reporting of individual caregivers
to the National Practitioner Data Bank was rare. 23 1
Another recent private sector medical center also has touted a disclosure
policy with the following recommendations given to staff: "Avoid words such as
error, mistake, fault, and negligence unless you are absolutely certain that an
error or mistake has occurred. Don't confess. Apologies for having caused the
outcome should be avoided unless responsibility is unmistakably clear." 232
One of the most strident voices for requiring physicians to say "I'm sorry" is
that of the "Sorry Works!" coalition.2 33 "Sorry Works!" has proposed that after
patients experience adverse events, root cause analyses would need to be
performed-presumably by a panel of members of the healthcare organization-
to determine if the standard of care was met. The performance of root cause
analysis for sentinel events is not controversial; The Joint Commission requires
similar actions for all accredited facilities. 2 34 "Sorry Works!" does not define
which events or outcomes would require such analysis; if all such events were to
be subject to root cause analysis, the effort would be staggering.235
A more troubling aspect of the "Sorry Works!" agenda is the requirement for
determining whether the appropriate standard of care was met. The Coalition
notes such analysis may take weeks to months and may involve the assistance of
226. Richard C. Boothman et al., Notes and Comments: A Better Approach to Medical
Malpractice Claims? The University of Michigan Experience, 2 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 125, 145-
46 (2009).
227. Allen Kachalia et al., Liability Claims and Costs Before and After Implementation of a
Medical Error Disclosure Program, 153 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 213, 215-17 (2010).
228. Id. at 220.
229. Id
230. Id
231. Id at 214.
232. Randolph R. Peto et al., Patient and Family Involvement: One System's Journey in
Creating a Disclosure and Apologv Program, 35 JoINT COMM'N J. ON QUALITY & PATIENT SAFETY
487, 492 (2009).
233. Doug Wojcieszak, John Banja, & Carole Houk, The Sorry Works! Coalition: Making the
Case for Full Disclosure, 32 JoINT COMM'N J. ON QUALITY & PATIENT SAFETY 344, 345 (2006).
234. JOINT COMMIssION HANDBOOK, supra note 102, at SE-2.
235. JOINT COMMISSION HANDBOOK, supra note 102, at SE-1.
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"outside experts." A root cause analysis showing that the standard of care was
not met due to medical error or negligence236 would require providers to admit
fault, apologize to the patient and/or family, fully disclose the sequence of
actions which led to the event, describe changes in hospital policy and procedure
made to try and prevent the same event from happening to other patients, and
make a fair offer of up-front compensation.237 The attorneys representing the
plaintiffs and providers would negotiate the compensation. Conversely, if the
root cause analysis finds that the standard of care was met, the providers would
not admit fault or offer to negotiate up-front compensation. In all respects, the
"Sorry Works!" approach is that of an extrajudicial legal proceeding.
The "Sorry Works!" approach suggests that each healthcare organization
should develop a "panel" to investigate each occurrence of an adverse event.
Struve has given considerable attention to the use of such panels, albeit in a more
formal extra-institutional setting, and has concluded that such screening panels
are unlikely to provide meaningful assistance in the analysis and disposition of
claims, concluding that: "[N]either theory nor experience strongly supports
proponents' optimistic view of screening panels." 2 38 Further, a significant
number of the states that adopted screening panel provisions subsequently
repealed or invalidated them.2 39 Although her study is somewhat dated when
compared to the current malpractice climate, Patricia Danzon analyzed insurance
company data on claims closed throughout the 1970s in response to a previous
malpractice crisis in 1975.240 She found that pretrial screening panels had no
significant effect on malpractice claims frequency or severity.2 4 1 The use of such
panels would not be expeditious (weeks to months as conceded by "Sorry
Works!") or low-cost. Panels would need to hold meetings, and conduct
discovery (documents, participants, witnesses, and experts) in order to gather the
facts. In jurisdictions where such findings are admissible as evidence trials,
236. Breach of standard of care is one element of negligence, a legal term which can only be
determined by finders of fact in a court of law.
237. Wojcieszak et al., supra note 233, at 345.
238. CATHERINE T. STRUVE, EXPERTISE IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION: SPECIAL
COURTS, SCREENING PANELS, AND OTHER OPTIONS (2003), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/
uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/
Medical liability/medical malpractice 101603.pdf.
239. Id. at 57.
240. PATRICIA M. DANZON, THE FREQUENCY AND SEVERITY OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
CLAIMS (1982); Patricia M. Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims,
27 J.L. & ECON. 115, 118 (1984); Patricia M. Danzon & Lee A. Lillard, Settlement Out of Court:
The Disposition of Medical Malpractice Claims, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 345, 377 (1983).
241. Patricia M. Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims: New
Evidence, 49 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 78 (1986) (concluding that the effect of screening panels
on claim severity is not consistent across the different equations, but there is no evidence that
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panels are likely to "entail the costs and delay that panels are intended to
prevent."242
D. Statutory Approaches: The "Apology" Laws
Federal Rule of Evidence 408, which has been widely adopted into state law,
generally prevents an offer of consideration to compromise a claim from being
admitted.2 43 Rule 408, however, is limited to offers of settlement, and apologies
are not specifically included. Even in this setting, an apology could be taken as
evidence of an admission of fault while other aspects of the negotiation would be
protected. A survey of states enacting apology laws identified thirty-four states
and the District of Columbia as having some protected disclosure of certain
statements made by putative offenders to victims.244 Of the thirty-five identified
statutes, twenty-five explicitly mention the word "apology."245 Only Montana
defines apology and includes in this definition expressions of regret, but not
responsibility. That the Montana legislature chose to exclude responsibility from
its definition suggests that the remaining states, in their statutes, intended to keep
the term "apology" as expressing responsibility, regret, and remorse; this is
evidence of a desire to keep apologies separate from other statements, as
admissions of fault.246
247
Eight states do not explicitly mention healthcare providers or patients,
242. Patricia M. Danzon, Costs ofLitigation, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE,
AND PUBLIC POLICY 199 (1985).
243. FED. R. EVID. 408 ("Compromise and Offers to Compromise(a) Prohibited uses.-
Evidence of the following is not admissible on behalf of any party, when offered to prove liability
for, invalidity of, or amount of a claim that was disputed as to validity or amount, or to impeach
through a prior inconsistent statement or contradiction:(1) furnishing or offering or promising to
furnish-or accepting or offering or promising to accept-a valuable consideration in
compromising or attempting to compromise the claim; and (2) conduct or statements made in
compromise negotiations regarding the claim, except when offered in a criminal case and the
negotiations related to a claim by a public office or agency in the exercise of regulatory,
investigative, or enforcement authority.").
244. For a detailed list of states that were identified as having disclosure statutes, see infra
app. 1. The state, identifying statute section, types of inadmissible statements, by whom the
statements can be made, to whom they can be made, and additional notes on specific aspects of the
individual state laws are also provided. For purposes of the text, the states will be identified by
name, not individual statute section numbers.
245. Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
246. Fraser, supra note 169, at 262; Coulmas, supra note 175, at 76; Scher & Darley, supra
note 170, at 129. See also Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109
YALE L.J. 1135, 1139-43 (2000).
247. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1160 (West 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.4026 (West 2001); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 626-1 (2007) IND. CODE ANN. § 34-43.5-1-3 (West 2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233
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instead choosing to use the same standard of disclosure for medical adverse
events as for car accidents or any other civil action. The Vermont legislature saw
fit to limit apologies and other statements to those made orally,2 48 while most
states have expanded such statements to include gestures and writings.
The state statutes also differ in who can make statements that are protected.
Most state statutes allow healthcare providers or healthcare professionals, as well
as employees or agents of healthcare providers or healthcare professionals to
make protected statements. 249 Oregon requires the person by or on whose behalf
statements are made to be a licensed professional. North Carolina and Louisiana
restrict the making of protected statements only to healthcare providers.250
Vermont and Washington statutes require that for statements-including
apologies-to be deemed inadmissible, they have to be made within thirty days
of when the provider knew, or should have known, about the consequences of the
adverse event.25 1 Utah awaits the bringing of a claim, and limits protective
statements made by, or on behalf of, defendants who are healthcare providers.252
Only New Hampshire is completely silent, which presumably means any
individual is able to make a protected statement.253
States also vary in defining to whom protected statements may be made. In
all cases the alleged injured individual is included, as are those persons defined
as relatives and/or family members. 2 54 A subgroup of states has also included a
variety of other representatives. 2 55 South Carolina requires that, in order to be
protected, the statements must be made during a designated meeting to discuss
the unanticipated outcome.2 56
§ 23D (West 2000); Mo. REV. STAT. § 538.229 (West 2005); TENN. R. EVID. 409.1; TEX. CIV.
PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 18.061 (Vernon 1999).
248. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 1912 (West 2005).
249. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2605 (2009); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-135 (West
2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-184d (West 2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 4318 (2006); D.
C. CODE § 16-2841 (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-37.1 (West 2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-207
(2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 § 2907 (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-1201 (2007); N. D. CENT.
CODE § 31-04-12 (2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.43 (West 2004); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63
§ 1-1708.1H (West 2009); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-1-190 (2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-52.1 (West
2009); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-11a (West 2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-130. (2009).
250. N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8C-1 (West 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3715.5 (2005).
251. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1912 (West 2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.64.010 (West
2006). Illinois had shortened the time frame to 72 hours but this statute was, as noted in Table 1,
declared unconstitutional.
252. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-422 (West 2006).
253. N.H. STAT. ANN. § 507-E:4 (West 2006).
254. States use, variously, the term victim, patient, plaintiff, or person.
255. Various states includes "health care decision-maker," "representative," "friend," "any
individual who claims damages by or through that victim," "legal representative," or "decision
maker for plaintiff." Utah defines patient as "any person associated with the patient."
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The circumstances under which statements are rendered admissible or
inadmissible have also been addressed. Most states have limited the
admissibility of statements-or their content-only when such statements
constitute admissions of liability or admissions against interest. These are narrow
restrictions; in fact, given the rarity with which a declarant (i.e. defendant) is
unavailable in a malpractice action as required for a statement against interest,
the only real function of such statutes is to preclude statements as admissions of
liability.257 Idaho and Montana specifically exclude statements as evidence,
including apologies, for any reason.258 Oregon, by law, precludes depositions of
Oregon Medical Board licensed practitioners or those making statements on their
behalf that have made expressions of regret or apology. 259 Vermont has similar
provisions. 260 Virginia protects the making of such statements only if death has
occurred.26 1
Thirteen states allow various admissions of liability, fault, negligence, or
culpable conduct.2 62 Delaware, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, and Nebraska are
particularly problematic, as in these states apologies may be protected as
statements, but may also be admitted as admissions of fault in part or in whole.2 63
In summary, apology holds a special place in the universe of statements that are
intended to express some form of sympathy towards a patient who has sustained
a medical care related injury. The stance of commentators and other interested
parties covers a wide spectrum of views on whether or not to apologize as a
specific form of remedial work. Taft would argue that the avoidance of
consequences by protective statutes strips the apology of a moral dimension:
"What elevates [an apology] to a truly moral and corrective communication is the
offending party's willingness to accept the consequences that flow from the
257. FED. R. EVID. 804 ("Hearsay Exceptions: Declarant Unavailable (b)(3) Statement against
interest. A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's
pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal
liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in
the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true.").
258. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-207 (2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-814 (2005).
259. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 677.082 (West 2003).
260. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 1912 (West 2005).
261. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-52.1 (West 2009).
262. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1160 (West 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4318 (2006); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 90.4026 (West 2001); HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-1 (2007); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-43.5-1-3
(West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3715.5 (2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2907 (2009);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 538.229 (West 2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-1201 (2007); N. H. STAT. ANN. §
507-E:4 (West 2006); TENN. R. EVID. 409.1; TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 18.061 (West
1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-52.1 (West 2009).
263. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4318 (2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-43.5-1-3 (West 2006); LA.
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wrongful act." 264 Any of a number of commentators have casually assumed that
265
apology is equivalent to other statements. Robbenolt has put forth empirical
evidence that a "partial apology" 26 6 may be an acceptable compromise between
circumspection and disclosure. However, "the effects of partial apologies on
settlement decision making appear to be much more complicated than the effects
of full apologies." 267 Lastly, Jesson and Knapp have noted that the patchwork of
apology laws throughout the United States has led to the need to involve legal
counsel in the decision of what to disclose and who to tell.2 68 Precisely defining
the contours of healthcare apologies would create at least three types of problems
for effective communication between physicians and patients or their families.269
Trying to craft a healthcare apology, regardless of statutory text, should create a
role for lawyers in the process of before any claims are brought or anticipated.
Retaining counsel will delay and change the nature of physician-patient
communication and cause delay.270 The Joint Commission has maintained that
effective apologies are made as quickly as possible after the adverse event
occurs-within twenty-four hours.271 A second problem is that the beneficial
effects of apologies, whether intended to promote healing or to avoid litigation,
stem from the openness of communication.27 2 Asking the lawyer to review a
proposed apology text invites revision and possible change of intended meaning.
Lastly, apologies will essentially fit the contours of any statutory protection for
healthcare apologies will result: "Simply put, once there is a safe harbor, all boats
264. Lee Taft, Apology Within a Moral Dialectic: A Reply to Professor Robbenolt, 103 MIcH.
L. REV. 1010, 1012 (2005); see also Lee Taft, Apology and Medical Error: Opportunity or Foil?,
14 ANNALS HEALTH L. 55, 62-67 (2005).
265. MICHAEL S. WOODS, HEALING WORDS: THE POWER OF APOLOGY 14 (Joint Commission
Resources 2d ed. 2007) (stating that the five "R's" of an effective apology are recognition, regret,
responsibility, remedy, and remaining engaged); Ken Braxton & Kip Poe, How Should Hospital
Policy Address Apologies to Patients?, 9 HoSPs. & HEALTH Sys. Rx 22, 22 (2007) ("Hospitals must
ensure that their risk management and legal staff fully understand their applicable state law
regarding 'I am Sorry' guidelines . . . ."); Kathy Wire, Apology Just First Step In Event
Management, 30 MED. LIABILITY MONITOR 8, 8 (2007) (suggesting that in cases of a clear error, the
accountable party should accept both error and responsibility. Such apologies could come from the
physician, hospital representatives or, most often, both).
266. Robbennolt, supra note 165, at 484.
267. Id at 506.
268. Lucinda E. Jesson & Peter B. Knapp, My Lawyer Told Me To Say I'm Sorry: Lawyers,
Doctors, and Medical Apologies, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1410, 1445 (2009) (noting that the
creation of an evidentiary exclusion for medical apologies inevitably means the creation of new
work for lawyers).
269. Id at 1447.
270. Id.
271. THE JOINT COMM'N, DISCLOSING MEDICAL ERRORS: A GUIDE TO AN EFFECTIVE
EXPLANATION AND APOLOGY 53 (2007).
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will moor there." 2 73  Once again, promptness of response and open
communication will be sacrificed in attempts to protect any intended statement.
In summary, apologies won't work, and attention should be placed in other
directions.
III. RATIONAL ALTERNATIVES TO AN APOLOGY
A. Promote Establishment of a National "Patient Safety Reporting System"
Leveling fault at an individual physician or other healthcare worker for the
occurrence of a complex systems error will not prevent the same or similar errors
from happening again.2 74 The physician may have not have made a mistake; or a
mistake may have been made but without causation in injury or death; or a
mistake was made, and causation shown, but a systems error was responsible.
"[E]rror identification requires a comfortable and candid relationship among
members of a healthcare team, built on trust among members that errors may be
openly discussed without fear of sanction in all but the most egregious cases."275
Both mandatory and voluntary reporting systems-which complement each
other-are required to make systems-based approaches to safety reporting,
improved patient safety, and error prevention and effect change that contribute to
decreased adverse events.276
To achieve the requisite understanding of how an adverse event occurred
and how best to prevent it from happening to others, it is necessary for each
institution to have a patient safety program reporting system that collects,
tabulates, analyzes and reports data on the frequency and nature of adverse
events as well as near misses.277 The primary function of a patient safety
reporting system should be to identify both real and potential adverse
consequences of overt as well as latent errors and make them visible to others.278
273. Id. at 1451.
274. INST. OF MED., supra note 3, at 4.
275. Kristen R. Salvatore, Taking Pennsylvania Off Life Support: A Systems-Based Approach
to Resolving Pennsylvania Medical Malpractice Crisis, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 364, 377 (2004)
(citing Barry R. Furrow, Medical Mistakes: Tiptoeing Towards Safety, 3 Hous. J. HEALTH POt'Y
181, 197 (2003)).
276. INST. OF MED., supra note 3, at 87.
277. John R. Clarke, Making Surgery Safer, 200 J. AM. C. SURGEONS 229, 233 (2005)
(abridging recommendation 7 of the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ)).
278. Lucinda Glinn, Navigating Provider Protections for Quality of Care Reports-From Peer
Review Statutes to Common Law Privileges, 9 HoSPS. & HEALTH SYs. Rx 16, 17 (2007) (advising
that reports critically analyzing adverse events that show imperfect processes or failures to follow
proper policies should be analyzed at the outset to ensure that the entirety of the quality review
process from gathering, to investigating and drafting the resultant report, is conducted by the proper
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Once adverse events are identified and analyzed, healthcare systems can be
redesigned so as to eliminate or minimize them. The highly successful Aviation
Safety Reporting System (ASRS) is good example of the type of reporting
system needed in health care. 279 The ASRS receives, processes and analyzes
voluntarily submitted reports of incidents from those in the airline industry.
Submitted reports describe crashes, other unsafe occurrences and "near miss"
hazardous situations.2 8 0
A successful reporting system such as the ASRS is typically nonpunitive,
confidential, anonymous, independent, timely, systems oriented, and responsive
to issues of human performance. 2 81 The absence of a punitive focus reduces
healthcare workers' concerns that reports might be used against them and thus
minimizes underreporting.282 In addition, it includes expert analysis, meaning that
reports are evaluated by persons who understand the relevant circumstances and
are trained to recognize underlying system-based causes. A successful reporting
system usually also tabulates seemingly rare incidents (including near misses)
even if there seems to be little direct or immediate benefit to doing so; in addition
to their potential value in larger contexts, such analyses may help institutions
predict and thereby avoid errors and system failures.283 The concerns about the
possible adverse consequences of a reporting system are quite strong. Andrus
believes that a healthcare reporting system can succeed only if legal immunity is
available: "A medical error-reporting system without absolute anonymity and
nondiscoverability that does not ensure absolute immunity from punitive results
for the reporter will not succeed."2 84
The fear of being sued is widespread among physicians; however, the
perceived risk of being sued is threefold greater than the actual risk.285 Whether
adverse event reporting should be voluntary or mandatory is still a matter of
debate. On one hand, voluntary reporting has a high inaccuracy rate even when
mandated by state or federal regulations.2 86 However, unless strict confidentiality
279. REASON, supra note 7, at vii.
280. ASRS Concept and Mission, AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM,
http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/overview/briefing/br 1.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2011).
281. Lucian L. Leape, Reporting ofAdverse Events, 347 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1633, 1633 (2002).
282. Lucian L. Leape et al., Systems Analysis of Adverse Drug Events, 274 JAMA 35, 43
(1995).
283. John W Senders, Medical Devices, Medical Errors, and Medical Accidents, in HUMAN
ERROR IN MEDICINE 159 (Marilyn S. Bogner ed., 1994); see also Error Reporting Does a Turn
Around, 23 Hosp. PEER REV. 121, 122 (1998).
284. Charles H. Andrus et al., 'To Err Is Human': Uniformly Reporting Medical Errors and
Near Misses, A Narve, Costly, and Misdirected Goal, 196 J. AM. C. SURGEONS 911, 916 (2003).
285. Emily R. Carrier et al., Physicians' Fears of Malpractice Lawsuits are Not Assuaged by
Tort Reforms, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1585, 1588 (2010).
286. Patricia W. Stone et al., Comparisons ofHealth Care-Associated Infections Identification
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is the standard, many surgeons fear reporting may increase the pressure to
conceal errors rather than study them; that it is unworkable in the current legal
regime of deterrence; and that it may result not in constructive patient safety
improvement, but punishment or censure:
The current culture of blame and litigation also works against the use of
voluntary error reporting. As several respondents indicated, until the legal
system is changed to protect physicians' rights and hospital administrators'
rights to maintain private data on errors and near-misses, it is less likely that
such data will be collected and analyzed. 287
B. Strengthen Protections for Reporting ofAdverse Events
Rather than focus on legislation that "protects" apologies from admission
into evidence, a better strategy might be to strengthen protections in other rules
of evidence, such as FRE 803(6), which addresses hearsay exceptions for records
of regularly conducted activity. 2 8 8 Currently, both of these Rules allow statements
to be admitted as evidence; hence most information obtained as a means to study
medical errors is admissible. The systems approach of patient safety to reducing
error is incompatible with the deterrence approach of medical malpractice
liability. A disciplined, systematic approach of empathy, coupled with competent
patient service immediately after an injury, an investigation (root cause analysis),
and a resolution are all within the limits of reasonableness given the complexities
of modem medicine. There are a variety of issues regarding requiring physicians
to apologize as opposed to having healthcare institutions disclose an error.
Patient safety can only be enhanced in a setting of protected disclosure not
only of successful initiatives but also injuries and "close calls" related to adverse
events. Healthcare professionals are best positioned to make patients safer-
certainly so with respect to plaintiffs attorneys and legislators. The federal
(noting that using each of two different reporting methods, only 8 of 89 central line associated
blood stream infections were identified using both methods).
287. Lori A. Roscoe & Thomas J. Krizek, Reporting Medical Errors: Variables in the System
Shape Attitudes Toward Reporting, 87 BULL. AM. C. SURGEONS 12, 16 (2002).
288. FED. R. EVID. 803 ("Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immaterial (6)
Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in
any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from
information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted
business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the
memorandum, report, record or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or
other qualified witness, or by certification that complies with Rule 902(11), Rule 902(12), or a
statute permitting certification, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of
preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term 'business' as used in this paragraph includes
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government appears to understand the need for a protected discussion of medical
adverse events to foster a culture of safety. Congress has been cautiously moving
in the direction of making patients safer by protecting those documents that result
from analysis of adverse events. On December 6, 1999, President Clinton signed
the Healthcare Research and Quality Act of 1999, reauthorizing the Agency for
Health Care Policy and Research and changing the name to Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). 289 AHRQ is charged with improving
patient safety by promoting research on healthcare outcomes and other measures.
Of even greater import, the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act
(PSQIA) of 2005 was enacted for the purpose of improving patient safety by
encouraging voluntary, confidential reporting of events that adversely affect
patients. 29 0 The act required the creation of patient safety organizations to collect,
aggregate, and analyze confidential information reported by healthcare providers.
PSQIA also calls for establishing a network of patient safety databases as an
interactive, evidence-based management resource. However, there are
shortcomings in the level of protection provided by the act. Under a number of
circumstances, patient safety organizations can be compelled to produce
documents otherwise protected, including information that is identified, is not
work product, and "not reasonably available from another source." 291 Further,
any information shared with patients or families, whether a limited factual
disclosure or an apology, is not protected.
In the healthcare setting, safety can be defined as freedom from accidental
injury.292 This definition recognizes that avoidance of accidental injury is an
overarching goal from the patient's perspective. In the past decade, the definition
289. Reauthorization Fact Sheet, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY,
http://www.ahrq.gov/about/ahrqfact.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2009) (describing AHRQ as the lead
agency of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services charged with supporting research
designed to improve the quality of healthcare, reduce its cost, improve patient safety, decrease
medical errors, and broaden access to essential services. AHRQ sponsors and conducts research
that provides evidence-based information on healthcare outcomes; quality; and cost, use, and
access).
290. Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-41, 119 Stat. 424.
("Amends the Public Health Service Act to designate patient safety work product as privileged and
not subject to: (1) a subpoena or discovery in a civil, criminal, or administrative disciplinary
proceeding against a provider; (2) disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) or a
similar law; (3) admission as evidence in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding; or (4)
admission in a professional disciplinary proceeding"). Defines "patient safety work product" as any
data, reports, records, memoranda, analysis, or written or oral statements which: (1) are assembled
or developed by a provider for reporting to a patient safety organization (PSO); (2) are developed
by a PSO for patient safety activities and which could result in improved patient safety or health
care quality or outcomes: or (3) identify or constitute the deliberations or analysis of, or identify the
fact of reporting pursuant to, a patient safety evaluation system. Id.
291. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-22 (2006).
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of patient safety has been expanded to acknowledge patient safety as both
emerging discipline and a process. 293 A number of states have begun to protect
patient safety analyses from discovery or as evidence in most civil
proceedings.2 94 Individual state laws, however, can be quite different. As an
example, the Oregon legislature protects patient safety data and reports, but the
privilege does not apply to records of a patient's medical diagnosis and treatment
295or to records created in the ordinary course of business. In Vermont, original
source information, documents, and records are not immune from discovery or
use in any other action merely because they were made available to the
296
department's patient safety surveillance and improvement system. In Virginia,
no privilege to a healthcare provider, emergency medical services agency,
community services board, or behavioral health authority for medical records
kept in the ordinary course of business precludes or affects discovery of or
production of evidence relating to hospitalization or treatment of any patient in
the ordinary course of hospitalization of such patient.297 However, for such
reports to be comprehensive and "kept in the course of a regularly conducted
business activity," 2 98 the protections regarding discovery and admissibility should
be further strengthened.
C. Remedial Work and Disclosure of the Adverse Event: Account, Not Apology
As errors-injury related and "near misses"-are documented and analyzed,
the disclosure of such errors to patients is being required with increasing
frequency. The Joint Commission approach requires disclosure by the attending
physician at the time the confidential report is submitted for patient safety and
293. Linda Emanuel et al., What Exactly is Patient Safety?, INFORMED 2010-2011
PENNSYLVANIA PATIENT SAFETY UPDATE, http://pa.cme.edu/index.aspx (last visited July 5, 2010)
(defining patient safety as "[a] discipline in the health care sector that applies safety science
methods toward the goal of achieving a trustworthy system of health care delivery"). "Patient
safety is also an attribute of health care systems; it minimizes the incidence and impact of, and
maximizes recovery from, adverse events." Id.
294. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-450.01(B) (2003); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2 1-110
(2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-127o (2004); D.C. CODE § 7-161 (2007); FL. STAT. ANN. §
395.1051 (2009); HAw. REV. STAT. § 624-25.5 (2008); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 522/10-25 (2005);
IND. CODE. ANN. 34-30-15-1 and IND. CODE. ANN. 16-40-5-6 (2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13:3715.3 (2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8753-A (2009); MD. CODE ANN.; HEALTH OCC. § 1-401
(2008); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 331.533 (1992); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.265 (2005) and
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 439.875 (2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 151:38 (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
26:2H-12.24 (2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131-E95 (2006); 40 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1303.311 (2006);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.21-8 (2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.41.200 (2007); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 35-2-912 (2008).
295. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 442.846 (2003).
296. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1917 (2005).
297. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.17 (2010).
298. FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
313
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risk management review. Pennsylvania has enacted Act 13 M-CARE legislation,
which requires the disclosure of medical injury to a mandated state reporting
recipient-the patient safety authority-and the affected patient and/or family.
M-Care also requires the establishment of patient safety committees for each
healthcare facility. In addition to the non-statutory and disclosure requirements
listed above, a number of other states are also getting into the act, with at least six
states enacting some form of mandatory disclosure.2 99
Encouraging physicians to apologize for adverse events is counterproductive
to the goal of improving patient safety. Physicians should, however, be involved
in a process of disclosure to ensure patients understand the medical implications
of the adverse event. Such information is important so the affected patient and
their families can make rational future decisions regarding their health. An
explanation or account, while often given in conjunction with an apology, is not
an apology. An "account," as used in this paper, is the offering of external,
mitigating circumstances and is a form of remedial work that seeks to reduce the
responsibility of the transgressor for the transgression. 00 The reduction of
responsibility entailed by an honest account of the events leading to the patient's
adverse event, may improve judgments made about the speaker and his or her
relationship to the transgression, however, it does so through mechanisms that
are distinct from apologies.
Accounts are intended to provide a fair analysis of the steps leading to
adverse events and in an attempt to counter accusations or claims brought into
courts adjudicate can usually be challenged or opposed in two ways. First, by
stating the facts and correcting misperceptions which a patient may have of
events which have occurred, and secondly, by leading to a frank discussion in
which the healthcare providers state that although all the elements on which a
claim could succeed are present, yet in the particular case of a specific patient,
the claim or accusation should not succeed because other circumstances are
present which makes the adverse event an exception, the effect of which is either
to defeat the patient's accusation or claim, or to 'reduce' it so that only a weaker
claim can be sustained.30 ' Austin has further separated such accounts, or in his
299. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.1051 (2005); NEv. REV. STAT. § 439.835 (2004); N.J. STAT. §
26:2H-12.25 (2005); 40 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1303.308 (2004); VT. STAT. ANN. § 1915 (2005).
300 ERVING GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC: MICROSTUDIES OF THE PUBLIC ORDER 109
(1971); C. R. SNYDER ET AL., EXCUSES: MASQUERADES IN SEARCH OF GRACE 300 (1983); Marvin B.
Scott & Stanford M. Lyman, Accounts, 33 AM. SoC. REV. 46, 46 (1968) (defining accounts as
statements made to explain untoward behavior and bridge the gap between actions and
expectations).
301. H. L. A. Hart, The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, in LOGIC AND LANGUAGE
(FIRST SERIES): ESSAYS BY PROFESSOR GILBERT RYLE, PROFESSOR J. N. FINDLAY, PAUL EDWARDS,
MARGARET MACDONALD, G. A. PAUL, DR. F. WAISMAN 147-60 (John Wisdom & Antony Flew
eds., 1952) (noting that philosophical difficulties arise when ignoring the concept of human action
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vernacular, excuses, into several types of speech acts.3 02 One may discuss having
performed an action, but also justify, or give reasons for the action.3 03 One may
discuss that the adverse event was not a good thing to have happened, but it is not
correct to say that one individual was responsible, or a slip occurred, or there was
an accident, or, that the provider was doing something different than the patient
perceived.304 In other words, the intent is to agree the adverse event is a bad
outcome, but it is not correct to think in terms of full or even partial
responsibility. 305 Austin argues against easy solutions:
[I]f we can only discover the true meanings of each of a cluster of key terms...
that we use in some particular field (as, for example, 'right', 'good' and the rest
in morals), then it must without question transpire that each will fit in place into
some single, interlocking, consistent, conceptual scheme. Not only is there no
reason to assume this, but all historical probability is against it .. 306
The same is arguably true for the wide variety of terms that can be applied to
conversations with patients who have sustained adverse events terms such as
statement, affirmation, gesture or conduct expressing apology, responsibility,
liability, sympathy, commiseration, condolence, compassion or a general sense of
benevolence. Apology, given the charged legal nature of the term particularly
seems not to fit into "some single, interlocking, consistent, conceptual scheme" 307
and stands alone as a strategy more harmful to patient safety and more likely to
condemn healthcare providers to costly, painful and often undeserved claims of
individual negligence and malpractice.
Accounts, on the other hand, can bridge the gap between adverse events and
patient expectations. 308 The development of an account is not to be taken lightly
and falls generally into one of two broad categories, both of which are
ascription and assumption of responsibility of assertions with simple utterances such as 'I'm sorry',
'I apologize', or 'I did it' are primarily speech acts by which one confesses or admits liability. Id.
302. J. L. AUSTIN, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 123 (J. 0. Urmson & G. J. Warnock eds., 1961).
303. Id at 124.
304. Id
305. AUSTIN, supra note 302 (discussing a wide variety of strategies for giving accounts: use
of modifying expressions; limitation of application; emphasis on negation; the "machinery of
action"; listing of standards of the unacceptable; combination, dissociation, or complication;
gradations of distinction; precise phrasing and style of performance; or the "trailing clouds of
etymology"); see also GOFFMAN, supra note 166, at 109 (noting the purpose of remedial work is to
change the meaning that might otherwise be given to an act).
306. Id. at 151 n.I.
307. Id. at 151 n.l.
308. Scott & Lyman, supra note 300, at 46 (noting accounts are important speech acts which
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underutilized in modem discourse: excuses and justifications.309 Accounts are
particularly useful in the disclosure of an adverse event noting the ability of an
account to "bridg[e] the gap between action and expectation" such as when a
medical injury occurs. 3 10 Scott and Lyman have suggested five linguistic styles-
intimate, casual, consultative formal, and frozen-which can be employed in the
giving of accounts. 3 1  These styles are intended to represent points in a spectrum
of speech that are acknowledged to merge into each other when reduced to real-
world situations. Some variation of three of the styles-consultative, formal, and
frozen-are likely to be useful in giving an account of an adverse event after
medical injury.3 12
CONCLUSIONS
Apologies-statements of regret, remorse and responsibility-do little to
achieve the policy goal of making patients safer in the healthcare setting. Modem
health care is delivered in a highly complex system, and medical injuries occur as
a sequence of errors from blunt end to sharp. Those who work in the healthcare
field are best situated to identify, report and correct system errors which injure
patients; these individuals are best positioned to make patients safer. A variety of
approaches are being used to improve systems and decrease errors that lead to
injury: root cause analyses, peer reviews, and morbidity and mortality
conferences are but a few. The principles of human performance are being used
to minimize the "human factors" that are a critical part of healthcare systems.
External organizations play an increasingly important role in monitoring and
analyzing injuries, with the purpose of identifying common errors that lead to
injury, and then establishing standards for minimizing variations in medical
practice.
Essentially all of the approaches to decreasing injuries rely on protected
disclosure and frank discussion regarding individual injuries and how to prevent
similar injuries in the future. Apologies, by chilling the open disclosure of
sensitive information and accompanying frank discussion, run counter to the
309. Id. at 247 (describing excuse as "a socially approved vocabulary[y] for mitigating or
relieving responsibility when conduct is questioned"). Four modal forms are described: appeal to
accident, defeasibility, biologic drive, and scapegoating. Id. See also HART, supra note 301, at 160
(providing further discussions of defeasibility "the capacity of being voided").
310. Scott & Lyman, supra note 300, at 46.
311. Id. at 55-56 (distinguishing three of the styles as: consultative, a verbal form ordinarily
employed when the amount of knowledge available to interactants is unknown or problematic, and
there is a definite element of objectivity; formal, often used when there are rigidly defined status
(i.e., physician and patient) or when the discussant is responding to six or more; and frozen,
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goals of improving patient safety. Unlike other forms of disclosure of the events
surrounding an injury, apologies also establish responsibility. In many
circumstances individual assignment of "shame and blame" unfairly open up the
involved individuals and organizations to liability and loss. Malpractice litigation
has often been justified as a deterrent to medical injury, however the ex post
nature of lawsuits, the focus of the plaintiffs attorney upon the individual client,
and the malpractice gap in which few are compensated and the high overhead
costs make litigation an inefficient-if not ineffective-way to make patients
safer; rather the intent of healthcare organizations to "do the right thing" coupled
with the knowledge of administrative action affecting licensing or accreditation
makes such an approach effective. For purposes of maintaining autonomy, the
patient must be offered an account of what happened, so they can make rational
decisions about their future care. However, such disclosure should be a carefully
scripted interaction, with input from all relevant sources.
There are rational and achievable alternatives to the use of apology in the
setting of medical injury. First, the development of a "Patient Safety Reporting
System" modeled along the lines of the Airline Safety Reporting System (ASRS)
should be developed. Such national reporting will be able to assess trends at a
macro level that would be difficult to discern within individual institutions. A
second alternative is to strengthen protections for FRE803(6) business records.
Other than peer review documents, essentially all medical documents are
discoverable under the business records exception. By increasing protection for
frank, open discussions of what went wrong and how to fix it, lines of
communication can be opened. Many states, through mandatory disclosure
statutes and private accreditation bodies, such as The Joint Commission, are
increasingly able to maintain oversight and encourage widespread participation.
Lastly, although apologies should be avoided, for purposes of maintaining
individual autonomy the patient must be offered an account of what happened, so
they can make rational decisions about their future care. Such accounts are a
second kind of remedial work that has not received enough study in the setting of
medical injury disclosure to patients. However, such disclosure should be a
carefully scripted interaction, with input from all relevant sources. In the vast
majority of injuries, it will not be possible to lay the blame upon one individual.
Attempts at assigning such blame will-counter to the need for open discussion
to decrease errors that lead to injury-drive the causes of error underground. An
account provided to the injured individual is morally praiseworthy, but in a
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APPENDIX 1
State/Statute Considered Inadmissible By whom To whom Notes
ARiZ. REv. STAT. any statement, affirmation, a health the patient, a inadmissible as
ANN. § 12-2605 gesture or conduct expressing care relative of evidence of an
(2009) Evidence apology, responsibility, provider the patient, admission of
of admissions; liability, sympathy, or an the patient's liability or as
civil commiseration, condolence, employee survivors or evidence of an
proceedings; compassion or a general sense of a health a health care admission against
unanticipated of benevolence care decision interest.
outcomes; provider maker for the
medical care patient
CAL. Evm. CODE A portion of statements, made to that Not explicit as to
§ 1160 (West writings, or benevolent person or to patients or health
2001) gestures expressing sympathy the family of care;
Admissibility of or a general sense of that person
expressions of benevolence relating to the A statement of fault,
sympathy or pain, suffering, or death of a however, which is
benevolence; person involved in an part of, or in
definitions accident addition to, any of
(repealed) the above shall not
be inadmissible.
COLo. REV, any and all statements, health care the alleged inadmissible as
STAT. ANN. § 13- affirmations, gestures, or provider victim, a evidence of an
25-135 (West conduct expressing apology, or an relative of admission of
2003) Evidence fault, sympathy, employee the alleged liability or as
of admissions- commiseration, condolence, of a health victim, or a evidence of an
civil compassion, or a general care representativ admission against




CONN. GEN. any and all statements, health care alleged inadmissible as
STAT. ANN. § 52- affirmations, gestures or provider victim, a evidence of an
184d (West 2006) conduct expressing apology, or an relative of admission of
Inadmissibility fault, sympathy, employee the alleged liability or as
of apology made commiseration, condolence, of a health victim or a evidence of an
by health care compassion or a general sense care representativ admission against
provider to of benevolence provider e of the interest.




DEL. CODE ANN. Any and all statements, health care the person, expressions or
tit. 10, § 4318 writings, gestures, or provider the person's admissions of
(2006) affirmations made by a health or an family, or a liability or fault are
Compassionate care provider or an employee employee friend of the admissible
communications of a health care provider that of a health person or of
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D. C. CODE § 16- an expression of sympathy or by or on a victim of Nothing herein shall
2841 (2007) regret made in writing, orally, behalf of the alleged preclude the court
Inadmissibility or by conduct the medical from permitting the
of benevolent healthcare malpractice, introduction of an
gestures. provider any member admission of









FLA. STAT. ANN. The portion of statements, made to that A statement of fault,
§ 90.4026 (West writings, or benevolent person or to however, which is
2001) Statements gestures expressing sympathy the family of part of, or in
expressing or a general sense of that person addition to, any of
sympathy; benevolence the above shall be
admissibility; admissible
definitions
GA. CODE ANN. § any and all statements, a health the patient, a The General
24-3-37.1 (West affirmations, gestures, care relative of Assembly issued
2006) Statements activities, or conduct provider the patient, findings regarding
or activities expressing benevolence, or an or a this statute.
constituting regret, apology, sympathy, employee representativ
offers of commiseration, condolence, or agent of e of the Statements are
assistance or compassion, mistake, error, or a health patient inadmissible as
expressions of a general sense of care evidence and shall
regret, mistake, benevolence provider not constitute an
etc.; not admission of
admission of liability or an
liability admission against
interest
HAw. REV. STAT. Evidence of statements or This rule does not
§ 626-1 409.5 gestures that express require the exclusion
(2007) sympathy, commiseration, or of an apology or
Admissibility of condolence concerning the other statement that
expressions of consequences of an event in acknowledges or
sympathy and which the declarant was a implies fault even
condolence participant though contained in,
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IDAHO CODE all statements and made by a a patient or inadmissible as
ANN. § 9-207. affirmations, whether in health care family evidence for any
(2006) writing or oral, and all profession member or reason including, but
Admissibility of gestures or conduct al or an friend of a not limited to, as an
expressions of expressing apology, employee patient admission of
apology, sympathy, commiseration, of a health liability or as
condolence and condolence, compassion, or a care evidence of an
sympathy general sense of benevolence, profession admission against
including any accompanying al interest
explanation
735 ILL. COMP.










equipment by or on behalf of
any person, or the offer to
provide, or pay for, . . . shall
not be construed as an
admission of any liability ...
Testimony, writings, records,
reports or information with
respect to the foregoing shall
not be admissible in evidence
as an admission of any
liability in any action of any
kind in any court or before
any commission,
administrative agency, or
other tribunal in this State,
except at the instance of the
person or persons so making








































of the law. It is
included as an
example of a statute
that attempts to do
something different
















shall not waive or
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a court may not admit into
evidence a communication of
sympathy ("communication
of sympathy" means a
statement, a gesture, an act,
conduct, or a writing that
expresses: (1) sympathy; (2)
an apology; or (3) a general
sense of benevolence.)




condolence, compassion, or a




























































contributing to: (1) a
loss; (2) an injury;
(3) pain; (4)
suffering; (5) a
death, or (6) damage
to property
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gesture or conduct expressing
apology, sympathy,
commiseration, condolence,














including but not limited to an
oral or written statement,




condolence, compassion, or a
























A statement of fault,
however, which is
part of, or in







an admission or a
statement against
interest, and shall
not be admissible in
evidence to establish
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an expression of regret or
apology, ... including an
expression of regret or
apology made in writing,

















liability in a civil
action.
An admission of
liability or fault that
is part of or in
addition to a
communication








MASS. GEN. Statements, writings or person or to
LAWS ch. 233 § benevolent gestures (actions the family of
23D (West 2000) which convey a sense of such person
Admissibility of compassion or commiseration
benevolent emanating from humane
statements, impulses ) expressing
writings or sympathy or a general sense
gestures relating of benevolence
to accident
victims
Mo. ANN. STAT. The portion of statements, that person Inadmissible as
§ 538.229 (West writings, or benevolent or to the evidence of an
2010) Certain gestures (actions which family of that admission of
statements, convey a sense of compassion person liability in a civil
writings, and or commiseration emanating action.
benevolent from humane impulses)
gestures expressing sympathy or a Nothing in this
inadmissible, general sense of benevolence section shall prohibit
when- admission of a
definitions statement of fault.
323
57
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MONT. CODE A statement, affirmation, the person, Not admissible for
ANN. § 26-1-814 gesture, or conduct the person's any purpose in a civil
(2010) Statement expressing apology, (a family, or a action for medical
of apology, statement, writing, or gesture friend of the malpractice.
sympathy, or that expresses regret) person or of
benevolence-not sympathy, commiseration, the person's
admissible as condolence, compassion, or a family





NEB. REV. STAT. any and all statements, a health the alleged A statement of fault
§ 27-1201 (2010) affirmations, gestures, or care victim, a which is otherwise
Unanticipated conduct expressing apology, provider relative of admissible and is part
outcome of sympathy, commiseration, or an the alleged of or in addition to
medical care; condolence, compassion, or a employee victim, or a any such
civil action; general sense of benevolence of a health representati communication shall
health care care ve of the be admissible.
provider or provider alleged
employee; use of victim Inadmissible as
certain evidence of an
statements and admission of liability
conduct; or as evidence of an
limitations. admission against
interest.
N. H. REv. STAT. A statement, writing, or that This section does not
ANN. § 507-E:4 action that expresses individual apply to a statement
(West 2010) sympathy, compassion, or to the of fault, negligence,
Evidence of commiseration, or a general individual's or culpable conduct
Admissions of sense of benevolence family that is part of or made






in a medical injury
action
N. C. GEN. STAT. Statements ... apologizing a health shall not be
ANN. § 8C-1 for an adverse outcome in care admissible to prove
(West 2004) Rule medical treatment, offers to provider negligence or
413. Medical undertake corrective or culpable conduct by
actions; remedial treatment or actions, the health care
statements to and gratuitous acts to assist provider in an action
ameliorate or affected persons brought under Article
mitigate adverse lB of Chapter 90 of
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N. D. CENT. A statement, affirmation, a health a patient or not admissible as
CODE § 31-04-12 gesture, or conduct ... that care to a evidence of liability
(2010) expresses apology, sympathy, provider, patient's or as an admission
Expressions of commiseration, condolence, or health relative or against interest in a
empathy compassion, or benevolence care representati civil action,
provider's ve arbitration
employee proceeding, or
or agent administrative hearing
regarding the health
care provider
OHIo REV. CODE any and all statements, a health the alleged inadmissible as
ANN. § 2317.43 affirmations, gestures, or care victim, a evidence of an
(West 2010) Use conduct expressing apology, provider relative of admission of liability
ofdefendant's sympathy, commiseration, or an the alleged or as evidence of an
statement in condolence, compassion, or a employee victim, or a admission against
medical liability general sense ofbenevolence of a health representati interest
action prohibited care ye of the
provider alleged
victim ___________
OKLA. STAT. any and all statements, a health the plaintiff, inadmissible as
ANN. tit. 63 § I- affirmations, gestures, or care a relative of evidence of an
1708.1H1. (West conduct expressing apology, provider the plaintiff admission of liability
2010) sympathy, commiseration, or an or a or as evidence of an
Statements, condolence, compassion, or a employee representati admission against
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For the purposes of any civil
action against a person
licensed by the Oregon
Medical Board, any
expression of regret or
apology made by or on behalf
of the person, including an
expression of regret or
apology that is made in
writing, orally or by conduct
I






compassion, mistake, error, or





























does not constitute an
admission of liability
for any purpose
A person who is
licensed by the
Oregon Medical
Board, or any other
person who makes an
expression of regret
or apology on behalf
of a person who is
licensed by the
Oregon Medical
Board, may not be
examined by
deposition or





with respect to an
expression of regret
or apology made by
or on behalf of the
person, including
expressions of regret
or apology that are











The defendant in a
medical malpractice
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TENN. RULES OF That portion of statements, Not specific to health
EVIDENCE; writings, or benevolent care, patients, or
Article IV. gestures (actions which physicians.
Relevance; Rule convey a sense of compassion
409.1. or commiseration emanating A statement of fault
Expressions Of from humane impulses) that is part of, or in
Sympathy Or expressing sympathy or a addition to, any of the
Benevolence general sense of benevolence above shall not be
inadmissible.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. a communication (a Not explicit as to
& REM. CODE statement; a writing; or a health care, patients,
ANN. § 18.061 gesture that conveys a sense or physicians.
(West 2009) of compassion or
Communications commiseration emanating a statement or
of Sympathy from humane impulses.) that: statements concerning
expresses sympathy or a negligence or
general sense of benevolence culpable conduct
relating to the pain, suffering, pertaining to an
or death of an individual accident or event, is
involved in an accident; admissible to prove
liability of the
communicator.
UTAH CODE ANN. any unsworn statement, the the patient Does not alter any
§ 78B-3-422 affirmation, gesture, or defendant (defined as other law or rule that
(West 2010) conduct [that] expresses (defendant any person applies to the
Evidence of apology, sympathy, in a associated admissibility of
disclosures- commiseration, condolence, malpractic with the evidence in a medical
Civil or compassion; or a general e action patient) malpractice action
proceedings- sense of benevolence; or against a
Unanticipated describes the sequence of health care
outcomes- events relating to the provider
Medical care unanticipated outcome of (includes
medical care; or the an agent
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An oral expression of regret
or apology, including any oral
good faith explanation of how
a medical error occurred
































does not constitute a
legal admission of
liability for any

















Pertains only to death,
shall be inadmissible
as evidence of an
admission of liability
or as evidence of an
admission against
interest.
A statement of fault
that is part of or in
addition to any of the
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Evidence of furnishing or
offering or promising to pay
medical, hospital, or similar
expenses occasioned by an
injury is not admissible.
A statement, affirmation,





condolence, compassion, or a
general sense of benevolence;
or any statement or
affirmation regarding
remedial actions that may be
taken to address the act or
omission that is the basis for
the allegation of negligence.)
... is not admissible as
evidence if it was conveyed
by a health care provider to
the injured person, or to
[other statutorily defined]
person ... within thirty days
of the act or omission that is
the basis for the allegation of
professional negligence or
within thirty days of the time
the health care provider
discovered the act or
omission that is the basis for
the allegation of professional
negligence
statement, affirmation,
gesture or conduct ...
expressing apology,
sympathy, commiseration,
condolence, compassion or a





















or as evidence of
admission against
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WYo. STAT. ANN. any and all statements, health care the alleged inadmissible as
§ 1-1-130. (2009) affirmations, gestures or provider victim, or to evidence of an
Actions against conduct expressing apology, or an a relative or admission of liability
health care sympathy, commiseration, employee representati or as evidence of an
providers; condolence, compassion or a of a health ye of the admission against
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